Submissions to the Inquiry

This page lists the submissions to the Inquiry that we know about so far.

If you are submitting information, please let us know.

Submissions to the Inquiry’s seminars


The Inquiry has listed on its website the articles presented at its expert seminars. It has stressed that the submissions “represent the opinions of the writers and should not be taken to represent or imply the views of the Inquiry Committee.”

Seminar on The Evolution of International Policy towards Iraq 1990-2003

What accounts for the evolution of International Policy towards Iraq 1990-2003? by Dr Toby Dodge, Reader in International Politics, Department of Politics, Queen Mary University of London and Senior Consulting Fellow for the Middle East, International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Seminar on Iraq and the Region on the Eve of the 2003 Invasion

Iraq and its environment before March 2003 by George Joffé, lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Cambridge.

Seminar on What were the causes and consequences of Iraq’s descent into violence after the initial invasion?

What were the causes and consequences of Iraq’s descent into violence after the initial invasion? [PDF – 563kb, 10 pages]
by Dr Toby Dodge, Reader in International Politics, Department of Politics, Queen Mary University of London and Senior Consulting Fellow for the Middle East, International Institute for Strategic Studies.

What were the causes and consequences of Iraq’s descent into violence after the initial invasion? [PDF – 58kb, 9 pages] by Gareth Stansfield, Professor of Middle East Politics, Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter.

Witness submissions

The Inquiry has published all “statements” made by witnesses, along with two memoranda from Jack Straw and a set of notes for a hearing on a single page. It has also published a number of other ad hoc submissions from witnesses, some of which are listed below.

Iraq: No Fly Zones (Foreign Office)

UN Security Council Resolutions on Iraq, 1990-2001 (Foreign Office)

Addendum to the evidence of Tim Dowse

The FCO’s knowledge of the internal political, social and economic picture in Iraq from early 2001 to March 2003 (Foreign and Commonwealth Office Research Analysts)

Alastair Campbell addendum to evidence

Submission to the Iraq Inquiry by Rt Hon Ann Clwyd MP on the work of INDICT

Submission to the Iraq Inquiry on the work of the Prime Minister’s Special Envoy to Iraq on Human Rights


Submissions from international lawyers


In June 2010 the Inquiry issued an open invitation to international lawyers to give their analysis of the arguments relied upon by the UK Government as the legal basis for the military intervention in Iraq. An extended deadline expired on 13 September but the Inquiry did not publish the submissions, despite having reserved the right to do so. Some of the submissions were subsequently put online, by the Guardian, the Digest and the individuals or groups who made them.

Submission from Philippe Sands QC

Submission from Dapo Akande, Marko Milanovic and others

Submission from Ralph Zacklin

Submission from Colin Warbrick

Submission from Alexander Orakhelashvili

Submission from Solicitors’ International Human Rights Group

Submission from Melinda Janki

Submission by Lionel Blackman

Other submissions


Letter from Human Rights Watch, 12 August 2009

Submission by Richard Heller, writer, 14 October 2009

Submission by Stan Rosenthal, web writer and Digest contributor, October 2009
(pdf file)

Submission by Andrew Mason, web writer and Digest contributor, October 2009
(pdf file)


Submission by Dr Chris Williams of the University of Birmingham (pdf file)

Submission from Geoff Taylor, Perth, Western Australia

Submission from Iain Paton, ex-RAF officer and Digest contributor


3 comments to this article

  1. George Rees

    on November 28, 2009 at 3:57 pm -

    12 Thistleboon Gdns

    Mumbles

    Swansea

    SA3 4HH

    27/11/09

    Dear Sir,

    It seems to me that the veracity or probity of the witness must be very relevant to this enquiry.

    Some people might feel that devotion and rationality have a low correlation.

    In this connection I should like to remind the enquiry that when questions were asked whether Mr Blair WMD was religious his mouthpiece, Alistair Campbell was instructed to say ”we don’t do God”

    At this same time Mr Blair , a closet, devout, Catholic was, in fact, receiving private masses from Father Seed in No 10.

    At the start of his submission, I would like the hearing to ask Mr Blair to define the meaning of ‘truth’

    I look forward to that.

    Yours truly

    George Rees

  2. John

    on December 11, 2009 at 7:00 pm -

    I cannot help but contrast the savaging of Dr David Kelly by the Parliamentary Committee with the kidglove approach of the Chilcot Inquiry.

    Of interest also is the stance of Mr Blair and his dismissal of the Just War Tenets of the Christian Church which should have informed his attitude on the morality of going to war on Iraq.

  3. Josh

    on March 9, 2010 at 1:10 pm -

    Uncorrected Transcript of Geoff Hoon speaking at a “mini Question Time” run by the Students’ Union at West Nottinghamshire College, Mansfield, on Friday the 16th of November 2007.

    Q: If you knew then what you know now, would you have voted for the war in Iraq?

    Hoon: If I knew then what I know now…? Well, the answer is that it would have made my life a lot easier if I hadn’t. But I was Defence Secretary at the time, so I didn’t really have much choice – I would have still done it.

    The real question is, “would you have organised and supervised the invasion of Iraq knowing what I know now?”, I would of, yes. And moreover, unfortunately when you take those decisions you don’t have that luxury. You don’t have that luxury of knowing what is going to happen.

    You can think about it… you can listen to all the people who give lots of reasons not for doing anything… you’ve got to make up your mind on the basis of the information that’s in front of you. And I’ve absolutely no doubt that on the information in front of me at the time, we were right to do it.

    Q: Do you think that there was sufficient post-war planning?

    Hoon: There was an enormous amount of post-war planning. It’s one of the things that the newspapers have never troubled to look at. I accept, and I’ve said so publicly, that we perhaps did not anticipate quite the kinds of trouble that we would have.

    I think we thought that because the population of Iraq hated Saddam Hussein, they would simply come out on the streets and everything would be fine.

    And there was some evidence of that when British troops first went into the first town – the “liberators of Umm Qasr”. But they weren’t actually cheering, and some of our soldiers couldn’t understand why not. What actually happened is that some of the people who actually were cheering were killed… were killed by Saddam’s people who were still around – actually it was heartbreaking.

    I don’t think we quite estimated the degree of control that Saddam’s people had in Iraqi society. We spent a lot of time planning for things like making sure they could eat – 65% of the Iraqi population were dependent on UN food handouts. We spent a lot of time making sure that they got fresh water – we built a pipeline from Kuwait to Iraq to make sure that there was enough water.

    So the kind of things we were planning for, with the benefit of hindsight, perhaps weren’t quite the right things. But they were the right things in terms of the problems that we anticipated, which was the lack of food, water… We probably didn’t quite appreciate, as I say, the ruthlessness of some of Saddam’s [followers].