This is a project to monitor and comment on the Iraq Inquiry.
Read more about the projectChilcot criticised again over the absence of an oath
by Chris Ames
More criticism – and adverse comparison with both the Leveson Inquiry and the Gareth Williams inquest – from this piece on the Daily Mail website:
So it is troubling to reflect that while the Leveson inquiry into media standards is making use of the oath to establish facts – just as the inquest into Gareth Williams’ death did to such effect – the ongoing Iraq Inquiry led by Sir John Chilcot opted to ditch the solemn vow.
Can an investigation into Britain’s role in this war be as effective if witnesses do not promise to tell the truth before they answer questions?
The government, under Gordon Brown’s management at the time the inquiry was set up in 2009, obviously thought so. Yet if not swearing an oath is deemed just as powerful as the act of swearing an oath, surely oaths should be sworn as a matter of course?
This year, next year – take your pick
by Chris Ames
With nothing from the Inquiry itself since December, the occasional news or comment article makes reference to the absence of the report. When it will appear seems to be anyone’s guess.
Yesterday the Evening Standard reported on Tony Blair’s plans to “re-engage” with British politics, saying:
The move comes as Sir John Chilcot is finalising his Iraq inquiry report which is expected to be critical of Mr Blair when it is finally published early next year.
On the same subject, John Kampfner in tomorrow’s Independent (thanks to John Bone for spotting this) says:
It is when Iraq is mentioned that the debate inevitably overheats. The historical reckoning will be informed by Sir John Chilcot’s verdict, which may finally deliver its report by the end of this year.
In this morning’s Indy, the leader commented on Lord Justice Leveson’s suggestion that he might ditch the final phase of his inquiry:
One need look no further than the Iraq Inquiry – now approaching its third year, at a total cost of more than £5m – to appreciate the benefits of brevity.
In the meantime, the government uses the existence of the Inquiry as an excuse not to disclose any further information about the war, much as David Cameron has used Leveson as an excuse not to look to closely at the conduct of Jeremy Hunt.
Information tribunal slams government witness
by Chris Ames
I have, somewhat belatedly, come across the Information Tribunal’s decision on the appeal of Fuel on the Fire author Greg Muttitt against the Information Commissioner, who supported the Cabinet Office’s decision to withhold certain documents relating to Tony Blair’s visit to post-election Iraq in May 2006.
Greg won the appeal but has still not received the documents ordered by the Tribunal to be released as the Cabinet Office are still trying to wriggle out of it. But the Tribunal’s decision is very interesting and important for what it says about the Cabinet Office, the Iraq Inquiry and, most of all, Cabinet Office witness Julian Miller, who was a witness at the Iraq Inquiry and of course previous inquiries.
The Iraq Inquiry should take note of the Inquiry’s very strong criticism of Miller’s credibility when considering his evidence to the Inquiry.
The context for the case is, as usual, the exemption unde Section 27 of the Freedom of Information Act and the usual claims of a government department that disclosure of discussions between it and other states would have serious negative consequences. This line is of course behind the Cabinet Office’s refusal to allow the Inquiry to publish the exhanges between Blair and George Bush.
I gave written and oral evidence in the Tribunal case and its decision refers to both:
He considered that the Chilcot Inquiry proceedings had provided little information on Mr Blair’s visit to Iraq in 2006, and that very few documents had been released by the Cabinet Office to the Inquiry. He also claimed: “In my experience, government departments invariably exaggerate the damage that would be caused by disclosure of information under FOI, particularly when citing Section 27. They do this both by exaggerating the impact of individual disclosures and by overlooking the context in which equally damaging information routinely comes into the public domain from other FOI disclosures and leaks, whether officially sanctioned or otherwise, and inquiries.” When cross-examined on this, he accepted that he had no experience of dealing with the fall-out from disclosures, but in re-examination he provided some examples to back up his opinion. We accept that in some instances Government departments may over-estimate the potential damage from disclosures, but Mr Ames’ choice of the word “invariably” was plainly inappropriate.
In fact, my use of the word “invariably” related to “my experience”. But in the context of the case, the Tribunal went on to find that the potential damage from disclosures had been exaggerated in the ways that I had described:
Reconstruction goes Pear Shaped in Iraq
Those Pear Shaped Comedy people have done another of their pages on the Inquiry, with some animations of transcripts – this time on the post-invasion situation and reconstruction efforts – and some commentary on the Inquiry’s policy of holding on to any newly declassified documents so that it can control what we learn when and contrive to make its own narrative or the Iraq story the dominant one.
More on that last point soon. In the meantime, here is the new Pear Shaped page.
Dr Brian Jones – Will Chilcot come too late?
by Andrew Mason
Paul Waugh makes only one tiny error in his otherwise exemplary tribute to Brian. His last post for the Digest was in fact this one, entitled “Will Chilcot come too late to give us lessons for Iran?“, and not the one that was linked to, which had been published here nearly two months earlier.
With the greatest of respect for Dr Jones, and in light of his important suggestion that perhaps bigger lessons need to be learned very soon, I have decided, on behalf of the Digest as a whole, to publish this final piece here again.
Will Chilcot come too late to give us lessons for Iran?
by Brian Jones
November 6 2011
The Guardian’s reporting of the possibility of military strikes against Iran because of its probable (but unproven) nuclear weapons programme and likely UK involvement is particularly relevant to the Digest because, for many of us, the situation in which “lessons learned” from Iraq might be significant was always most likely to be military action involving Iran and its WMD. It is good that comments by John Bone and Bobm have got the ball rolling.
Although the UK aspect – rightly criticised for lack of substance in one Guardian reader’s letter – should be treated with extreme caution, reporting in the US press of statements by those keen to talk-up the potential problem demand attention.
Given the present rumblings and comments on this made by Tony Blair in his evidence to the Iraq Inquiry, there can surely be few acceptable excuses for the Inquiry’s continued leisurely pace. The silence of Parliament on this suggests that the efforts of Sir John Chilcot and co are sliding dangerously close to irrelevance.
The uncertain intelligence and half-baked justification offered in Guardian background pieces for a US/UK attack on Iran’s probable (nuclear) weapons of mass destruction programme sound all too familiar. Fortunately, its leaders (including that in today’s Observer) are much more rational – as was Richard Norton-Taylor’s Comment is Free piece, although I would be less concerned than he about the Iranian leaders’ supposed irrationality. In my view military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities would be unlikely to eliminate its likely weapons programme and would only serve to stiffen the resolve of all sides in Iran.
In general terms, I think a couple of points should be noted. This problem continues to be cast in nuclear terms. We hear no mention of any capabilities that Iran may have with biological or chemical weapons capabilities (i.e. WMD). I would be very concerned about provoking a BW-capable Iran that has an extended global reach, not with missiles, but through links with terrorists. Unlike with Iraq, this particular nexus might be far more feasible. And, for this and more direct practical reasons, I’m afraid the dream of disarmament (global or regional) is too distant to guide medium term policy. Thus, as undesirable as it is, the world has to come to terms with an expanding number of states which possess or are on the threshold of possessing not only nuclear but biological and chemical weapons as well.
But why should we, rather than France or Germany, find ourselves embroiled in all this? It is because we have a government dominated by a Tory party that, whilst repeatedly taking Labour to task for its “dodgy” dossier, still, in retrospect and without further explanation, continues to support the decision to go to war in Iraq. I have heard a serving minister include the impossibility of not supporting the US as one element in his explanation. Furthermore, many of the senior civil servants involved in the deception have achieved promotion and are advising the present government on security matters.
It is very difficult to see that even a nuclear armed Iran need be a significant threat to our national security in a timescale that precludes the consideration and development of a more coherent security policy on WMD. Central to that policy may be a re-evaluation of our policy with the US, including its implications with respect to Israel and the Middle East problem in general. I would like to think Chilcot would kick start a debate on this issue. His committee has had time to think about it.
Brian Jones 1944-2012
by Chris Ames
I was shocked and deeply saddened to learn today that Digest contributor – and my good friend – Brian Jones has died.
Paul Waugh has already written a very touching and accurate piece here, which sums up why he had so much respect for Brian. I think he has described Brian’s qualities very well and I won’t try to replicate it.
What I will say is that Brian was one of those who prompted me to create the Digest and someone without whose support, knowledge and expertise it would not have been half as well-informed as I hope and believe it is. Neither will it be as good in the future, without Brian’s input. Despite the respect that he must have known I had for him, Brian would always send me his contributions for me to “consider” whether I would use them. Needless to say I always did and you can read them here. Regular users of the Digest may have noticed that Brian stopped contributing and commenting a few months ago and will now understand why.
Having given evidence to most of the previous inquiries on Iraq, Brian was determined to make sure that the current inquiry would do a better job and tried to achieve this both by contributing to the Digest and giving evidence to the Inquiry itself. He wanted to ensure that the issues were understood and not fudged. It’s very sad indeed to lose Brian so suddenly and sad that he will never see the outcome of this inquiry. Whether that will be something that would have given Brian some satisfaction or provoked some of the same frustration remains to be seen.
Brian was a real hero to me and someone I’m very proud to have known and worked with.
Chirac conundrum not solved
by Chris Ames
I watched the first episode of the BBC documentary series Putin, Russia and the West on Thursday night and read David Blair’s review of the programme for the Telegraph yesterday.
You can watch the programme here, which is just as well because David Blair says:
The US-Russia relationship was essentially on an even keel right up until the Iraq war. Here, the documentary settled a vexed question that was pondered by our own Chilcot inquiry on Iraq: would France under Jacques Chirac really have vetoed any UN resolution providing authority for war? Yes, said Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, then the Elysee’s senior diplomat. He recounted how Putin and Chirac agreed to block any such resolution during a meeting “a deux” in February 2003. So Tony Blair’s testimony was right: France genuinely was determined to scupper his drive to secure UN backing for war.
Unfortunately, this is the same old misrepresentation, based on claiming that when Chirac said in March 2003 that France would vote against a second UN resolution in the current circumstances, this meant that it would have at any time “vetoed any UN resolution providing authority for war”. What was said on the programme was this:
Narrator: Putin wanted Chirac’s word that he would vote against the war, unless there was hard evidence that Iraq had weapons of Mass Destruction.
Gourdault-Montagne: The joint position was agreed. If there a vote without these conditions we would both veto it.
Here is what Chirac said subsequently:
THE PRESIDENT – My position is that, regardless of the circumstances, France will vote “no” because she considers this evening that there are no grounds for waging war in order to achieve the goal we have set ourselves, i.e. to disarm Iraq.
As should be well established by now, Chirac’s reference to “regardless of the circumstances”, was in the context of stressing that there may or not be a Security Council majority for war. In the latter case, France would not need to use its veto. But the point that he repeatedly stressed in the interview, that his stance applied to the current circumstances – “this evening” – is the same point that Gourdault-Montagne made in the interview. France was not yet convinced that there was a case for war based on Iraq’s alleged hiding of WMD. In the terms in which Gourdault-Montagne put it, the conditions under which France would support a resolution were not met.
So no, the documentary did not settle the question, did not show that Tony Blair was right and did not agree to veto “any UN resolution providing authority for war”. It’s the same old lie recycled.
My pick for the end of the (war) year
by Andrew Mason
Never Forget the Iraq War
Paul R. Pillar was the CIA’s national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia from 2000 to 2005. In early 2006 he became publicly critical of the Bush Administration’s political use of intelligence material to evidently justify the March 2003 invasion of Iraq.
He wrote that:
“In the wake of the Iraq war, it has become clear that official intelligence analysis was not relied on in making even the most significant national security decisions, that intelligence was misused publicly to justify decisions already made, that damaging ill will developed between policymakers and intelligence officers, and that the intelligence community’s own work was politicized. … The administration used intelligence not to inform decision-making, but to justify a decision already made. It went to war without requesting — and evidently without being influenced by — any strategic-level intelligence assessments on any aspect of Iraq.”
He now writes regularly at The National Interest. On 15 December he published the following essay, plainly timed to coincide with the formal ending (at least as far as the US is concerned) of the war in Iraq.
Read the rest of this entry »
Seasonal greetings from the Digest
by Andrew Mason
Once again we would like to collectively thank all our writers, readers and supporters for their individual contributions to the Digest over the course of this past year.
I think it is fair to say that many of us believed a year ago that we would all have seen, read and, dare I say it, completely digested the final Iraq Inquiry report by this time. As we now know, the whole process is taking much longer than was earlier anticipated, and is now not expected to be concluded until at least next summer. We will remain dedicated to bringing you the best possible coverage and analysis of all things related to the Inquiry throughout the coming year.
We would like to wish everyone associated with the Digest, no matter of any differing political persuasions, a happy, prosperous, and most enjoyable holiday season.
Key letter is indeed “missing”
by Chris Ames
I wrote earlier this month about a key document (in fact two versions of a letter) that the Foreign Office said it was unable to find in response to my freedom of information request. At the time I passed this information on to the Inquiry, which has now confirmed that it has been given one version of the letter but not the one that is most revealing.
To recap very briefly, in September 2002, the FCO’s UN Department sent UN ambassador Sir Jeremy Greenstock a draft letter from foreign secretary Jack Straw’s office to No 10 which included a proposal to use a UN resolution to engineer a situation where Iraq would refuse to readmit weapons inspectors.
In response to my FOI request, the FCO provided a copy of a later draft but said it could not find the copy sent to Greenstock or the final version of the letter. The implication, at least as far as the original draft was concerned, was that the Inquiry had not been given the letter, if the FCO did not have it.
Margaret Aldred, Secretary to the Inquiry, has now written to me, helpfully stating that:
… the Inquiry holds a copy of the letter to No 10 from Mr Straw’s office, which was provided by another Government Department, and I am sending a copy of this letter to the FCO’s Inquiry Unit. The Inquiry has acknowledged that the Government has not been able to find every document which may be relevant; the draft letter forwarded to Sir Jeremy Greenstock by UND is one of those documents.
It is a concern that what could be an important piece of evidence is not available to the Inquiry, although the Inquiry itself is clearly taking the cock up rather than conspiracy line. I can only hope that the significance of the draft letter, as described by Greenstock’s contemporaneous account, has been understood.