Iraq Timeline
This page is a timeline of significant events leading up to the invasion of Iraq. We have highlighted, as is our opinion, the most important and significant dates along this timeline. This is not a conclusive record of everything that has occurred with regards to Iraq, and we will periodically update the timeline to compile a more complete picture of the events and circumstances of recent history.
1990
2 August Iraq invades Kuwait – about 100,000 Iraqi troops cross the border to completely seize Kuwait within a matter of hours. United Nation Security Council Resolution 660 condemns this action.
6 August Security Council Resolution 661 demands an “immediate and unconditional” withdrawal of Iraqi forces and imposes a strict trade embargo on Iraq.
7 August US troops begin to arrive in Saudi Arabia as the United States launches Operation Desert Shield.
28 August Iraq declares Kuwait to be its 19th province.
17 October Coalition forces troops in the Gulf region rise to 200,000 from the US, 15,000 from the UK and 11,000 from France with smaller numbers from other nations.
29 November The Security Council states that Iraq must voluntarily withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January 1991. Resolution 678 gives authority to use “all necessary means” to force Iraq out if it does not comply. Baghdad rejects this “ultimatum”.
1991
9 January U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz meet in Geneva, Switzerland, for talks, but these end with no progress.
17 January Operation Desert Storm begins. The ‘air war’ phase is launched at 7:38 a.m. (local time) with Apache gunship helicopter attacks against Iraqi air defence radar sites. US Air Force F-117 stealth warplanes attack targets in Baghdad.
18 January Iraq launches its first wave of Soviet-made SCUD missiles at Israel.
20/21 January Riyadh and Dhahran, in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, are similarly attacked.
22 January Iraqi forces begin to destroy Kuwaiti oil wells.
24 February Coalition forces cross the border and begin the liberation of Kuwait at around 4 a.m. Baghdad time.
26 February Saddam Hussein orders an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Thousands of retreating Iraqi troops are killed as they pull back to Iraq.
28 February Exactly 100 hours after the ground phase of the war began, President George HW Bush orders the end of the Gulf War.
1 March A cease-fire plan is negotiated at Safwan in Southern Iraq. Iraq agrees to abide by all UN resolutions concerning itself.
3 April Resolution 687, the so-called “cease-fire agreement”, is passed by the Security Council. This resolution calls for the destruction or removal of all chemical and biological weapons, all stocks of agents and components, all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities for ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km and related repair and production facilities. Iraq must recognize Kuwait, account for missing Kuwaitis, return Kuwaiti property and end its support for international terrorism. The resolution creates a special commission, UNSCOM, to inspect Iraq’s chemical, biological and nuclear facilities.
6 April Resolution 687 is accepted by Iraq.
18 April Iraq declares some stocks of chemical weapons and related materials, and claims that it does not have biological weapons program.
19 April Rolf Ekéus, a Swedish diplomat, is appointed as the first Executive Chairman of UNSCOM.
9 June UNSCOM begins the first WMD inspections in Iraq.
15 August Resolution 706 is proposed, allowing Iraq to export up to $1.6bn of oil, the revenue from which would be paid into a UN-administered account to be used to buy food, medicines and other essential material for Iraqis for an initial a six month period. Resolution 707 is also passed, emphasising the need for Iraq to allow UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) immediate and unconditional access to any areas they wish to inspect.
11 October Resolution 715 is passed, which approves UNSCOM and IAEA plans for ongoing monitoring and verification. The resolution demands that Iraq “accept unconditionally the inspectors and all other personnel designated by the Special Commission”.
Iraq stated that it considers the Monitoring and Verification Plans adopted by Resolution 715 to be unlawful, and that it is not ready to comply with the Resolution.
1992
18 February Rolf Ekéus reports Iraq’s refusal to abide by the disarmament resolutions.
19 March Iraq reveals the existence of chemical weapons and 89 Scud missiles. It states that it unilaterally destroyed most of these materials during the previous summer, in violation of Resolution 687.
July UNSCOM begins its destruction of large quantities Iraqi chemical weapons and production facilities.
26 August The first “no-fly zone” is established in southern Iraq, which prohibits the flight of Iraqi aircraft south of latitude 32 degrees north.
1993
27 June The US launches a cruise missile attack at the Iraqi intelligence headquarters in Baghdad, in response to a (claimed) attempted assassination of former President George Bush in Kuwait in mid-April.
September/October Iraq threatens to stop cooperating with UNSCOM inspectors. It begins to deploy troops near the Kuwait border. The US sends more military forces to Kuwait in response.
1994
15 October The UN Security Council passes Resolution 949, demanding that Iraq immediately withdraw forces recently deployed towards Kuwait and must “co-operate fully” with UNSCOM. Iraq backs down and begins to work again with weapons inspectors.
1995
March Iraq reveals more information about its prohibited past biological and chemical weapons programmes.
14 April Resolution 986 formalises the “Oil for Food” programme.
Summer UN agreement on Iraq policy starts to become contentious. France and Russia begin to oppose other permanent members of the Security Council.
1 July Iraq, for first time, is forced to admit to the existence of an offensive biological weapons programme, but still denies that these were weaponised.
July Iraq states that if sanctions are not lifted by 31 August 1995 it will end all cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA.
August Iraq supplies UNSCOM with its third ‘Full, Final and Complete Disclosure’ concerning its prohibited biological weapons programme.
7/8 August Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law, defects to Jordan. Following his defection, Iraq makes new revelations about the full extent of its biological and nuclear arms programmes. It then withdraws its last formal BW declaration, and turns over a large amount of previously withheld documents.
November Iraq makes a second ‘Full, Final and Complete Disclosure’ about its prohibited missile programme.
1996
February (?) UNSCOM begins using eavesdropping devices in Iraq. The information is delivered to Britain, Israeli, and US intelligence agencies.
20 February Hussein Kamel returns to Iraq and is killed within days of his return, along with his members of his family.
March UNSCOM inspection teams are refused access to five sites previously designated for inspection. The teams gain access to one site only after a ‘stand-off’ of 17 hours.
27 March The Security Council passes resolution 1051, relating to the need for Iraqi imports and exports, particularly “dual-use items”, to be monitored by UNSCOM and the IAEA. This resolution reaffirms that Iraq should meet unconditionally all its obligations under the inspections mechanism and cooperate fully with the inspection bodies.
May-June Al-Hakam, Iraq’s main production facility of biological warfare agents, is destroyed under UNSCOM supervision.
12 June The Security Council passes Resolution 1060, which states that Iraq’s actions represent a clear violation of the earlier resolutions. It also demands that Iraq grant “immediate and unrestricted access” to all UNSCOM designated sites.
13 June Iraq again denies access to sites chosen for inspection by UNSCOM.
July UNSCOM forces the issue by attempting to conduct a surprise inspection on a Republican Guard facility. Scott Ritter leads this inspection, but is blocked by Iraqi officials. Inspectors are allowed into the facility after several days, but nothing is found.
Summer Some UN Security Council Members express unease about UNSCOM’s confrontational tactics.
3 September The southern ‘no-fly zone’ is extended to latitude 33 degrees north.
November UNSCOM inspections discover buried missile parts. Iraq refuses to allow UNSCOM teams to remove remnants out of the country for analysis.
1997
26 March US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright states in a speech made at Georgetown University that sanctions on Iraq probably will not end until Saddam Hussein is no longer in power.
21 June Iraq again refuses UN inspection teams access to sites under investigation.
The Security Council passes Resolution 1115, which condemns Iraq’s actions and demands that UNSCOM’s teams be allowed immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any sites for inspection and officials for interviews.
July Australian diplomat Richard Butler replaces Rolf Ekéus as Executive Chairman of UNSCOM.
September Iraq provides more information on its prohibited biological weapons programs.
12 November The Security Council passes Resolution 1137, which condemns Iraq’s continued violations of earlier resolutions, and once again demands that Baghdad complies fully with the requirements of UNSCOM inspection teams.
13 November Iraq orders the expulsion of all American arms experts. UNSCOM withdraws all weapons inspectors because of this.
20 November Saddam Hussein agrees to allow UN weapons inspectors to return to Iraq.
24 November Iraq refuses UNSCOM access to inspect Iraqi Presidential Palaces.
22 December The Security Council issues a statement which calls on Iraq to cooperate fully with the commission, and states that failure by Iraq to provide immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any site is an unacceptable and clear violation of Security Council resolutions.
1998
January Iraq claims that Scott Ritter is a spy.
15 January Bill Richardson, US Ambassador to the UN, tells Ritter to go back to Bahrain.
20 February UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan negotiates a deal with Saddam Hussein, allowing weapons inspectors to return to Baghdad. This intervention prevents US/UK military action taking place.
23 February Iraq signs a “Memorandum of Understanding” with the UN, which says that the country will accept all relevant Security Council resolutions, cooperate fully with UNSCOM and the IAEA, and will grant UNSCOM and the IAEA immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access for their inspections
Spring UNSCOM discovers a dump full of destroyed Iraqi missiles. After analysis of the missile parts the US claims that Iraq had filled warheads with the chemical agent VX.
4 April UNSCOM inspectors complete initial inspections of eight Iraqi Presidential Palace sites.
8 April UNSCOM reports to the UN Security Council that Iraq’s declaration on its biological weapons program is incomplete and inadequate.
3 August UNSCOM Executive Chairman Richard Butler meets with Tariq Aziz who demands that weapons inspections must end immediately and that Iraq must be certified as free of weapons of mass destruction. Butler says he cannot do that.
5 August Iraq again suspends all co-operation with UNSCOM teams.
26 August Scott Ritter resigns from UNSCOM. He sharply criticized the Clinton administration and the U.N. Security Council for not being vigorous enough about insisting that Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction be destroyed. Ritter also accused U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan of assisting Iraqi efforts at impeding UNSCOM’s work. “Iraq is not disarming,” Ritter said, and in a second statement, “Iraq retains the capability to launch a chemical strike.”
29 September The United States Congress passes the “Iraq Liberation Act”. This bill states that it is US policy to remove Saddam Hussein from power, and to replace the Iraqi government with a new democratic institution.
31 October President Clinton signed into law HR 4655, the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998. Iraq then ends all forms of cooperation with the UNSCOM teams and expels inspectors from the country.
13/14 November The US President orders air strikes on Iraq. These are called it off at the last minute when Iraq promises once again to unconditionally cooperate with UNSCOM.
23/26 November According to Richard Butler, Iraq ends cooperation with UNSCOM inspectors, alternately intimidating and withholding information from them.
30 November Richard Butler then meets with US National Security Advisor Sandy Berger in order to coordinate timelines for a possible military strike against Iraq.
11 December Iraq announces that weapons inspections cannot take place on Fridays, the Muslim day of rest. Iraq refuses to provide test data from the production of missiles and engines.
13 December The US President secretly approves an attack on Iraq.
15 December The UN Security Council is told by Richard Butler that Iraq is still blocking inspections.
16-19 December UNSCOM and the IAEA withdraw all of their weapons inspectors from Iraq. ‘Operation Desert Fox’ is launched, hitting 100 Iraqi WMD related targets in four days of bombing. The reason for these attacks is said to be “Saddam Hussein’s failure to provide unfettered access to UN Special Commission on Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency arms inspectors”.
19 December Iraqi vice-president Taha Yassin Ramadan announces that Iraq will no longer cooperate with the UN and declares that UNSCOM’s “mission is over.”
21 December Three of five permanent members of the UN Security Council (Russia, France, and China) call for lifting of the eight-year oil embargo on Iraq, recasting or disbanding UNSCOM, and firing Butler. The US says it will veto any such measures.
1999
4 January Iraq requests that the UN completely replace its UNSCOM US and UK staff.
17 December The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) is created, as a replacement for UNSCOM. Resolution 1284 is passed, Iraq is once again ordered to allow inspections teams immediate and unconditional access to any weapons sites and facilities.
Iraq rejects this resolution.
2000
1 March Hans Blix becomes the new Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC.
November Iraq rejects new proposals for UN weapons inspections.
February US and UK airborne forces carry out bombing raids aimed at disabling Iraq’s air defense network.
2001
11 September Mass casualty attacks on New York and Washington
20 September According to UK Ambassador Christopher Meyer, Bush tells Blair that, after the invasion of Afghanistan, “we must come back to Iraq”.
2002
29 January George Bush makes State of the Union speech naming Iraq, Iran and North Korea as “an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world”.
7 March Cabinet Meeting. According to Robin Cook this was “the last cabinet meeting at which a large number of ministers spoke up against the war”.
8 March Cabinet Office Options paper says that the intelligence on Iraq’s wmd is “poor”.
11 March Dick Cheney meets Blair at Downing Street. Blair says: “no decisions have been taken on how we deal with this threat, but that there is a threat from Saddam Hussein and the weapons of mass destruction that he has acquired is not in doubt at all.”
12 March David Manning, Blair’s chief foreign policy adviser tells Condoleezza Rice, US national security advisor, that Blair “would not budge in [his] support for regime change”.
15 March JIC issues paper on Iraqi WMD.
17 March Christopher Meyer, UK ambassador tells Paul Wolfowitz, US deputy secretary of defense, that Britain “backed regime change but the plan had to be clever and failure was not an option.”
21 March Iraq dossier shelved
22 March Peter Ricketts, Foreign Office political director, sends a letter to Jack Straw stating: “even the best survey of Iraq’s WMD programmes will not show much advance in recent years on the nuclear, missile or [Chemical Warfare/Biological Warfare] fronts.”
25 March Jack Straw send Tony Blair a memo stressing the need to present the elimination of Iraq’s WMD capacity, rather than regime change, as the objective of UK policy.
2 April Meeting at Chequers. According to Alastair Campbell’s published diaries, participants “discussed whether the central aim was WMD or regime change. … TB felt it was regime change.”
3 April Blair tells NBC news: “We know that he [Saddam Hussein] has stockpiles of major amounts of chemical and biological weapons.”
4 April Blair meets Bush at Crawford, Texas. Agrees to take part in invasion, subject to conditions.
10 April Blair tells Parliament that “no decisions on action have been taken”.
11 April Cabinet Meeting, at which Patricia Hewitt warned that invading Iraq would cause “a lot of tension among the Muslim communities in Britain”.
23 April Campbell meets officials including John Scarlett “to go through what we needed to do communications wise to set the scene for Iraq, e.g. a WMD paper and other papers about Saddam.”
16 July Blair appears at the House of Commons Liaison Committee. Asked, “Are we then preparing for possible military action in Iraq?”, he replies “No, there are no decisions which have been taken about military action.”
21 July Officials at the Cabinet Office Defence and Overseas Secretariat produce a briefing paper entitled “Iraq: conditions for military action”.
23 July A meeting at 10 Downing Street reaches the conclusion that: “We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions.”
August Blair phone call to Bush.
20 August Straw meets Colin Powell in US.
3 September Tony Blair announces that the government will publish a dossier of evidence that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. Says: “He is without any question still trying to develop that chemical, biological, potentially nuclear capability….”
12 September George Bush addresses UN General Assembly.
16 September Iraq agrees to return of UN Inspectors.
24 September UK government publishes dossier on “Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction”.
8 November UN Security Council passes Resolution 1441
3 December The Foreign Office publishes a “dossier” entitled SADDAM HUSSEIN: crimes and human rights abuses, based on unused material from the September wmd dossier. Straw claims “He’s got these weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological and, probably, nuclear weapons.”
2003
31 January Meeting at the White House at which Bush and Blair allegedly discuss the absence of proof of that Iraq is in breach of UNSCR 1441 and discuss alternative ways to provoke a war.
January/February Tahir Jalil Habbush, head of Iraqi Intelligence, tells MI6 that Iraq does not have wmd.
20 February Following a meeting with JIC Chairman John Scarlett, Robin Cook concludes that “Saddam probably does not have weapons of mass destruction in the sense of weapons that could be used against large-scale civilian targets.”
7 March Attorney general Lord Goldsmith provides lengthy, detailed and equivocal advice on the legality of the proposed invasion.
10/11 March Michael Boyce, chief of defence staff asks for clear statement on war’s legality.
13 March Goldsmith concludes that war would be legal if Iraq is in material breach. Goldsmith meets Lord Falconer and Sally Morgan. Cabinet meets.
17 March Goldsmith publishes unequivocal advice that war will be legal. Robin Cook resigns. Cabinet discusses Goldsmith’s advice.
18 March Elizabeth Wilmshurst, deputy chief legal adviser at the foreign office, resigns. Parliament votes to support invasion.
20 March Invasion begins with “shock and awe” assault on Iraq.
4 Responses to “Iraq Timeline”
Comment from chris
Time October 15, 2009 at 7:47 am
Nick, this is a good point.
It’s mainly that the timeline is work in progress and has concentrated on the period with which the Inquiry is concerned. Also because the plan for regime change in Iraq seems to have arisen soon after 11 September.
But the timeline should clearly cover issues of the weapons inspections up to 1998 and operation Desert Fox and before that the 1991 Gulf war.
Comment from Iain Paton (former RAF)
Time October 19, 2009 at 11:08 pm
Desert Fox was a critical event – it gave rise to the lie that the inspectors had been “kicked out” and in fact they were withdrawn prior to the bombing.
Also, the end of Gulf War 1 and the use of chemical weapons (disastrously for his own troops) by Saddam in the Iraq-Iran war. Plus the various controversies over the supply of arms and material to Saddam by Western regimes during the sanctions period.
At first I was disappointed that Chilcot was starting his timeline in 2001. However, as the inquiry appears to be looking at actions and decisions taken in the prelude to war and not revisiting actions and decisions prior to that time. I would expect that the inquiry will consider these actions and decisions in the context of events pre-2001 context…such as the withdrawl (rather than expulsion) of inspectors.
Comment from Andrew M.
Time October 20, 2009 at 12:22 pm
Iain -
I too share your initial concern that the remit of the Inquiry is too narrow, limited as it is to events post-Summer 2001. From a parliamentary answer given by Gordon Brown, the terms of reference were suggested with advice coming from the Cabinet Office, and then agreed upon with the consultation of leading opposition party figures.
A full understanding of many of the outstanding Iraqi WMD issues will not be made unless events prior to 2001 are considered in some detail. In particular, Iraqi reasoning for its non-complete disclosures and previous (apparent) non-co-operation with UNSCOM etc have not (to date) been discussed widely, and this aspect has a large bearing on the earlier Western belief that WMD items still existed in Iraq. I wonder if the Inquiry will hear evidence from ‘the other side’, for example from individuals such as Tariq Aziz and Amir al-Saadi. Somehow, I fear that it will not.
Comment from Nick Horsefield
Time October 15, 2009 at 2:04 am
Since it has long been established that there was no significant link between Sadam’s Iraq, and the September 11 attack on the twin towers, why does your time line begin with that event?