Alastair John Campbell was Director of Communications and Strategy for Prime Minister Tony Blair at No 10 Downing Street from 1997 to 2003.
Questions for Alastair Campbell
Here are some of the questions that we believe the Inquiry should ask Alastair Campbell. We would welcome any further suggested questions, particularly if they come with an explanation of why they are relevant. If you would like suggest questions that go some way to refining the ones we already have here or raise different issues, please use the comment box at the bottom of the page. (Or otherwise feel free to contact us directly if you prefer to remain anonymous.)
When did you first become aware that Tony Blair had promised the Bush administration that he “would not budge” in his support for regime change?
Were you present at a meeting at Chequers on 2 April 2002 when Tony Blair said that the main aim of supporting the planned US invasion was “regime change”.
Were you present at a meeting at Downing Street on 23 July 2002 when Sir Richard Dearlove said that in the US “the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy” of invading Iraq?
The September 2002 dossier
Having heard that in the US “the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy” of invading Iraq, why did you tell John Scarlett that the UK dossier should complement rather than conflict with US claims?
When was the Iraq Communications Group formed, how was it paid for, how were its members selected, whom did it report to, what was its mission?
Why did you tell the Hutton Inquiry that there was not a dossier on 9 September 2002 when, as you knew very well, a draft dossier had been presented on that date by John Williams?
Why did you tell the Hutton Inquiry that you had no knowledge of the meeting of the dossier drafting group on the afternoon of 9 September 2002?
Was Daniel Pruce representing you/No 10 at meetings of the drafting group?
Why did you tell the Hutton Inquiry that Daniel Pruce was “not terribly closely involved in the process” of producing the dossier when he attended both meetings of the drafting group and reported back to you on them?
How many communications officials attended meetings of the dossier drafting group and who were they?
What did the communications officials who attended meetings of the dossier drafting group contribute to those meetings?
At whose suggestion was the 45 minutes claim, which had not been in previous versions of the dossier wmd section, added to the dossier following the meeting of the dossier drafting group of 9 September 2002?
Why did you ask John Scarlett, in an email of 19 September 2002, to add a false claim to the dossier, that “the JIC assessed in early 2002 that they could produce nuclear weapons in between one and two years”
Did you believe that JIC reports or “intelligence” had “established beyond doubt” that Iraq had wmd?
What was the response of the JIC to the assertion, in your early drafts of the foreword, that JIC reports had “established beyond doubt” that Iraq had wmd?
You told the 2003 Foreign Affairs Committee Inquiry in June 2003 that the foreword to the dossier, which you wrote, was literally signed off by the chairman of the JIC and that the JIC had to be happy that it was a fair reflection. But John Scarlett has told this Inquiry that the foreword was overtly political and that he did not see it as something that he would change.
Why did you not sue the Mail On Sunday when it published an article by Andrew Gilligan which named you directly as responsible for exaggerated claims in the September dossier? Why did you concentrate on the later BBC comment by Gilligan, which did not name you at all?
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