

## ANNEX A

### STATEMENT OF DR. BRIAN FRANCIS GILL JONES FOR THE HUTTON INQUIRY

1. I retired from the Civil Service in January 2003, having been employed by the MOD since 1973. From 1987 until retirement I was a branch head in the scientific and technical directorate of the Defence Intelligence Analysis Staff (DIAS) which is in turn part of the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS). My grade was unchanged throughout that time, although it was variously called Senior Principal Scientific Officer (SPSO), Grade 6 and latterly B1. It is the grade immediately below what is now the "Senior Civil Service." From 1987 until 1996 the work of my branch included the analysis of intelligence from all sources on global Chemical Warfare (CW) and Biological Warfare (BW) capabilities. After a major reorganisation of the DIS in 1996 I took charge of a newly constituted branch that brought together all three elements (i.e. CW, BW and nuclear) of what is now often referred to as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Shortly before I retired, following another reorganisation in October 2002, I was temporarily in charge of a branch covering similar fields but constituted in a different and expanded form.
2. I first met David Kelly in about 1986 at an MOD management training course shortly after he joined the Civil Service, but we did not work together until after I joined the DIS. From about 1988 or 1989 we occasionally worked together on a number of sensitive issues and developed a positive working relationship. For a period in the early 1990s David Kelly worked very closely with my BW staff. He and I were friendly rather than "friends" and had no significant contact outside work. From the late 1980s David Kelly had been cleared by the appropriate vetting process to read BW related intelligence reports, initially at my discretion and as allowed by the rules or where appropriate by special permission of the issuing authority. David Kelly's access to intelligence in this way was typical of the means by which the specialist expertise of MOD scientists outside of the intelligence community was utilised by intelligence analysts. At some stage I became aware that a direct relationship had developed between David Kelly and officers of the SIS, so I ceased to be aware of the full scope of his visibility of intelligence or his involvement with it.

3. From the late 1980s until I retired David Kelly's physical presence in my Branch was not unusual. He had an MOD pass that gave him unaccompanied access to the DIS area of the Old War Office and I encouraged him to drop in whenever the opportunity presented itself for discussions and debates with my staff and me, although in recent years my personal contact with him had reduced. David Kelly was a valuable source for us of general information on BW issues, especially in relation to Iraq, and also as an expert microbiologist whose scientific and technical input was greatly valued. I should mention that he had a separate relationship with at least one other group in the DIAS, concerned more specifically with Iraq and arms control than was my branch.
4. My staff had been involved in the preparation of the Government's dossier on Iraq's WMD during the first half of 2002 but little had happened about that during the summer of 2002. I was on holiday from 30 August until 18 September. On my return my staff informed me that work on the dossier had begun again in my absence and indeed had dominated their workload while I was away. During the three weeks of my absence I was told that there had been several drafts of the dossier to consider each requiring a rapid response. I believe the latest draft was still being worked on by my staff on 18 September. The expert Iraq CW analyst in my branch told me he was concerned that some proposed modifications to the text that he considered important were not being accepted by the Cabinet Office Assessment Staff. He was reiterating the most significant comments on the latest draft, but he was not hopeful that they would be accepted at this stage because they had been rejected before. I advised him that if his concerns remained serious at the end of the process he should note them formally in a minute to me.
5. I should explain that the DIS interface with the Cabinet Office Assessment Staff for this work was the responsibility of a branch in another Directorate which dealt with Proliferation. That branch was coordinating input from several parts of the DIAS including each of the three groups in my branch that covered nuclear, biological and chemical warfare.

6. I had returned to work on Wednesday 18 September and was on leave again on the Friday so I only had two working days before the dossier was due to be finalised for publication. In view of the large number of other matters I had to deal with in this short time, I decided I would not personally review the whole document (which was large and complex) or look back at the various drafts, but would be guided by my staff to areas where they had concerns or, on the basis of their knowledge of my general views, they felt I might have concerns. I established that the nuclear analysts were satisfied that their issues with earlier drafts of the dossier had been resolved but I was concerned by several aspects of the dossier that were drawn to my attention by the CW and BW analysts.
7. During the course of 18 September 2002 I spoke briefly with David Kelly when I encountered him working in the office of my BW staff. I understood him to be reviewing the latest available version of the dossier. The nature of our conversation that day was, as usual, casual and informal. In the course of it I asked him what he thought of the latest version of the dossier and was surprised, in view of the concerns expressed by my staff to which I have referred, when he responded that he thought it was good. I cannot recall the exact extent of any further discussion of the dossier with him at that time, but I am sure we did not have a full exchange, probably because I was still developing my own assessment. In view of my BW/CW experts' judgement, and my own cursory look at the dossier, I was concerned that David Kelly's views may conflict with those of my branch because I had great respect for his judgement, especially in this area, and I believe I mentioned this to some of my staff.
8. I recall that a further version of the dossier arrived on the morning of 19 September 2002. My CW expert told me that several of his issues remained unresolved in this version and that he would minute me in this regard. At some point on that morning a member of my staff told me that both David Kelly and another former MOD UNSCOM inspector who had focussed on Iraq CW were coming into the branch to look at the latest version of the dossier. Knowing of my concern about whether David Kelly had views which might contradict those of my staff, it was suggested there would be an opportunity for a collective discussion. I welcomed the suggestion and arranged for my experts on CW and BW and the two visitors to come to my office for

a discussion, I think in the late morning. The nuclear analysts were not involved because they had no outstanding issues. My purpose in hosting the discussion was to satisfy myself that my staff's concerns with the dossier were not contradicted by these other experts.

9. The meeting was short, probably no more than 30 minutes, because of the other pressures on everyone that day. A discussion of views took place and reached a satisfactory conclusion from my point of view. I recall summarising the position at the end of the meeting in this way: David Kelly and the CW UNSCOM inspector had focussed their attention on the "historical" and "inspection" related aspects of the dossier and thought they were good. My staff were primarily concerned with the assessment of intelligence, especially the more recent information. My BW staff were not completely happy with the dossier, but felt they could live with it. The chief CW analyst remained very unhappy with the dossier from the CW perspective. I concluded the meeting by saying that I would be raising the concerns of my analysts with our line managers in the DIAS. I felt content that I had been able to reconcile the views I had heard and that they were not contradictory.
10. I do not believe that David Kelly or the CW UNSCOM inspector expressed any views relating to the recently announced intelligence during the meeting. My staff may have outlined this intelligence but would not have discussed it in detail. I did not seek a view from either visitor on the intelligence assessment.
11. At some point on 18 or 19 September before the meeting, I was told of the existence of some additional highly sensitive, compartmented intelligence which underpinned the dossier, but which could not be revealed to many, including my staff and myself. It was suggested that my Director had seen such material. I investigated this to the extent I could, but could gain no confidence in the existence of relevant material. This does not mean it did not exist because sometimes even revealing the existence of reports can be sensitive. I discussed the matter with my Director, who had been in post for only a few weeks and had limited previous experience of intelligence. He told me that he had not seen such reports, but that he had been reassured by a senior SIS officer that the relevant human intelligence supplied was sound. I made it clear to him that I felt it would not be

appropriate for me to accept such an assurance without having access to the reports. I also doubted that anyone with sufficient CW and BW intelligence expertise to properly analyse reports on this subject had seen these compartmented reports.

12. I eventually found someone who had seen the compartmented reports. They did not volunteer and I did not ask about the detailed content of these reports. I explained the reservations that my staff and I had about particular aspects of the draft dossier and asked whether the compartmented reports resolved any of these concerns. The answer I received was that they would not. I accordingly decided that it was important that I should record my views. I therefore sent a minute to my Director on 19 September and, in view of the proximity of publication of the dossier, decided to copy this to DCDI (my countersigning, or second reporting, officer) who is a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee. I recall that my CW expert sent a minute recording his own views the following day by which time a further version of the dossier had been produced.
13. Apart from the fact that the production of a dossier of this sort was an exceptional occurrence, it was very unusual, in my experience, to formally express concern about a JIC product in this way. I had done so only once or possibly twice before in the 15 years of my involvement with the JIC production process. I did not expect that this action would lead to changes to the dossier because I assumed it was too late for this, but I thought it important to record a significant difference of view. The minute I sent to my Director, copied to DCDI, was a contemporaneous summary of the concerns we had about the dossier at the time of the discussion meeting described above. At that time, or shortly afterwards I believe David Kelly would have been aware of most, if not all of them.
14. At no time after August 2002 did I have direct discussion with any member of the Cabinet Office Assessment Staff on the dossier. I was not aware that any of my staff had such discussions after the dossier was issued. During the course of its preparation it is quite likely that my staff will have been in direct discussion with the Assessment Staff from time to time, about particular aspects of the drafts. Such exchanges are normal in the production of assessments, and on occasion they can be very frank. But I cannot recall being told of any

exceptional exchanges on this occasion. I am not aware that anyone else from within the DIAS formally expressed any concern about the final version of the dossier.

15. I do not think the idea of producing a dossier was universally welcomed within the UK intelligence community, but I think it was accepted as a requirement of the Prime Minister and I am not aware that anyone challenged this. During the production of the dossier I believe there was a degree of frustration among some in the DIS that the Assessment staff were more reluctant than usual to accept suggested modifications. I do not know how others in the intelligence community felt about the drafting process. I did not seek the views of anyone in the broader UK intelligence community about the final dossier and I am not aware that any of them were concerned about it.
16. Although I met David Kelly a few times after the dossier was published before I retired and he was aware that I had raised my concerns about the dossier up to DCDI, at no time did he indicate to me that he personally shared any reservations about the dossier. The impression I gained is that he thought it was broadly in line with the views he held on Iraq, and that its publication might help to resolve the existing stand-off. I have a recollection that in one conversation after the UNMOVIC inspections of Iraq had commenced he observed that the threat of military action had at least produced this positive result. I last saw David Kelly in mid-January 2003 when I invited him to my retirement "bash" a few days later. Regrettably he was unable to attend because he had business in New York.
17. Attached to this statement is copy of my letter to DCDI of 20 August 2003, written to express concerns I had having seen the evidence emerging in the Hutton Inquiry. Since writing that letter I have been asked to give evidence to the Inquiry and have accordingly had an opportunity to better familiarise myself with the factual background so that I now know some of the detail in my letter is incorrect and this statement sets out the correct position.