The end game
by Chris Ames
I’ve just posted this piece on Comment is free.
The Iraq inquiry seems to have saved the best till last. At the last session of its second phase, the Chilcot panel used former foreign secretary Jack Straw’s appearance as little more than a canvas on which to paint a picture of what really happened in the run up to war. Straw could do little more than agree, comment that the inquiry had seen the documents and try to put his gloss on things.
Once again, the inquiry has used a witness session with a key decision maker to tell the public – perhaps more directly than ever – what is in the documents that they have seen but are not allowed to publish. At the end Sir John Chilcot said that however revealing the sessions have been, the great bulk of the evidence, telling us “what really went on behind the scenes”, is in the documents. It is not entirely satisfactory but it is the best we will get for now.
5 Responses to “The end game”
Comment from Anthony
Time February 9, 2010 at 12:49 am
Like you Iain, I don’t think somebody like Professor Freedman has agreed to do this job with the thought of allowing his reputation to be ruined by it, as Hutton did. I come from an academic background and I feel sure that, whatever his motivation might be, sustaining his academic credibility will be uppermost in his mind. I can’t see how it can be in his interest to put his name to a report with conclusions that are contradicted by evidence he has seen, and that may come out later.
As to the documents, the Inquiry is allowed to see them – that must be for a purpose, so it must surely be accepted that they can use classified material as a basis for their report. Do we know their modus operandi? Presumably they can’t quote from a classified document, but are they allowed to say ‘documents we have seen indicate that ….’? Or are they limited to making apparently unevidenced assertions which are in fact evidenced by classified material?
Comment from Lee Roberts
Time February 9, 2010 at 5:13 am
What matters is not that Chilcot will find fault…that would have happened if he had sat there like a porcelain dog. How much more fault can he find than we already know. What matters is that he will conclude that no laws were broken and that this enquiry ends the matter. If that is good enough for you, and academic reputations,its certainly not goos enough for me and the millions who believe Britain has been deeply shamed by this affair and want to see justice.
Comment from Anthony
Time February 9, 2010 at 10:43 am
I think you’re mixing up a number of issues there Lee. There must be great significance in the recent opinion poll that showed that 31% of those polled thought Tony Blair should be tried for war crimes. That is a remarkably high proportion and not far short of the number of people who voted for him in 2005 (35%). In the light of that, I find it surprising that Chris doesn’t devote a section of this website to an in-depth examination of the issues to do with war crimes and whether Blair and/or others are potentially culpable.
On the other hand, I personally don’t know of a law which Blair appears to have broken, even though his foolish misjudgment of the consequences of his reckless actions might well be said to be criminal in common parlance.
I take it that the point for you is that you suspect that there are classified documents that Chilcot, Freedman etc will see and which will indicate that a crime was committed, but Chilcot, Freeman etc will deny their existence and report that no crime was committed. If this site was examining the war crimes/any crimes aspect, I guess we would be speculating as to what nature of documents those might be, in relation to an assessment of specifically what crime might have been committed, and what kind of evidence one might need in order to prove it.
Comment from Lee Roberts
Time February 10, 2010 at 10:04 am
Anthony: Yes, I believe Chilcot will never go further than lessons learnt. So if the secret documents contain indictable evidence, he will bypass that and it will not be revealed.
I dont think for one moment that the fact that 31% polled now believe Blair should be tried, is in any way a credit to Chilcot. It coincides with an overwhelming majority who believed Blair lied consistently and is doing so today. That is a consequence, in my view, of Blair’s presentation. I did not read a single commentator that did not draw the conclusion that, with the exception of a brief set of questions from Lyne, the panel screwed up unforgiveably on Blair day. If Chilcot had been serious and competent, far more than 31% would now believe Blair should be tried for war crimes.
I do appreciate that most of the commentators here are fascinated by the record and the inconsistencies, and commenting on the political implications of Chilcot is “bad form”. In one sense, there is very little seam between Chilcot and the commentaries here…they make different interpretations, but all are happy to treat this as an academic enterprise. Wouldnt be at all surprise if books are being planned or even written right now. I have this damn awkward, sentimental attachment to the memories of tens of thousands of innocent little children that Blair massacred. But as I have said, that is surely “bad form”.
Comment from Iain Paton
Time February 8, 2010 at 10:08 pm
The documents will be published after the General Election….assuming the Tories get in. Chilcot has an eminent team, all with established reputations to protect. They cannot afford to be at odds with the evidence.
There is also the small matter of the integrity of governance. It’s an Establishment affair, but the Establishment and New Labour were always uneasy bedfellows. The biggest failing in Iraq was the politicisation of the machinery of government through the executive role of special advisers and what became known as ’sofa government’. I think this will dominate the final conclusions.
Straw is in an awkward role, as midwife to the war. He pushed and prodded, massaged and encouraged, until it popped out courtesy of Goldsmith’s declaration of legality. Straw appears to have wanted his advice both equivocal and unequivocal depending on what it was.
Bottom line is that this can never happen again. If Brown (or Cameron) started waving around an Iran dossier in 2011, compiled by Campbell or others, there would be the real threat of unprecedented civil disorder. The greatest threat is ‘crying wolf’ – a genuine threat met with public distrust and opposition. This is what the Inquiry must prevent.