Iraq Inquiry Digest

Comment from John Bone
Time November 1, 2009 at 4:30 pm

It is very disturbing to hear Blunkett’s interpretation of Resolution 1441. He apparently believes that every member of the UN Security Council believed that Iraq had WMD when the SC passed Resolution 1441. What evidence is there for that belief? Will the Inquiry be asking the members of the Security Council about their interpretation of Resolution 1441 or for their version of the events surroundng the UK’s attempt at a second resolution?

Comment from Andrew M.
Time November 2, 2009 at 2:42 am

“I took the view that the United Nations security council resolution was very clear and laid down what Saddam Hussein had to do to qualify for an agreement that he had fulfilled the terms of resolution 1441 and when he didn’t…”

Who says he didn’t?

Comment from Stan Rosenthal
Time November 2, 2009 at 12:57 pm

Hans Blix for one, Andrew. On January 30 2003 he said that “Iraq had not fully accepted its obligation to disarm” Obviously the obligation he was referring to was under the related UN resolutions.

Earlier On December 7, 2002, Iraq had filed its 12,000-page weapons declaration with the UN in order to meet requirements for resolution 1441. The five permanent members of the Security Council received unedited versions of the report, while an edited version was made available for other UN Member States. On December 19, Hans Blix reported before the United Nations and stated in regards to Iraq’s December 7 report (unedited version): “During the period 1991-1998, Iraq submitted many declarations called full, final and complete. Regrettably, much in these declarations proved inaccurate or incomplete or was unsupported or contradicted by evidence. In such cases, no confidence can arise that proscribed programmes or items have been eliminated.” By March, Blix declared that the December 7 report had not brought any new documentary evidence to light.

Comment from andrewsimon
Time November 2, 2009 at 4:06 pm

Stan -

Part of the problem with quoting selective Wikipedia paragraphs is that they very often fail to supply the correct contextual background (which is usually supplied by the original source documentation).

Your quote here refers to Hans Blix’s briefing to the Security Council on 19 December 2002: Inspections in Iraq and a preliminary assessment of Iraq’s weapons declaration.

Here are some other notable paragraphs from this section entitled: Third part: a preliminary assessment of Iraq’s declaration of 7 December:

“The first point to be made is that Iraq continues to state in the Declaration, as it has consistently done before its submission, that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, when inspectors left at the end of 1998 and that none have been designed, procured, produced or stored in the period since then.”

“While individual governments have stated that they have convincing evidence to the contrary, UNMOVIC at this point is neither in a position to confirm Iraq’s statements, nor in possession of evidence to disprove it.”

“In resolution 1441 (2002), Iraq was given an opportunity to provide a fresh declaration and to make it verifiable to the inspecting authorities by submitting supporting evidence. It remains to analyse in detail how much is clarified by the new declaration and supporting material. When we have performed a more thorough analysis, we may ask Iraq for supplementary information and clarifications.”

“The overall impression is that not much new significant information has been provided in the part of Iraq’s Declaration, which relates to proscribed weapons programmes, nor has much new supporting documentation or other evidence been submitted. New material has, on the other hand, been provided concerning non-weapons related activities during the period from the end of 1998 to the present time.”

“It would appear that the part that covers biological weapons is essentially a reorganized version of a previous declaration provided by Iraq to UNSCOM in September 1997. In the chemical weapons area, the basis of the current Declaration is a declaration submitted by Iraq in 1996 with subsequent updates and explanations. In the missile field, the Declaration follows the same format, and seems to have largely the same content as Iraq’s 1996 missile declaration and updates.”

“Although it must be noted that much of what Iraq has provided in the weapons part of its Declaration is not new, there are some sections of new material. In the chemical weapons field, Iraq has further explained its account of the material balance of precursors for chemical warfare agents. Although it does not resolve outstanding issues on this subject, it may help to achieve a better understanding of the fate of the precursors.”

“In the missile area, there is a good deal of information regarding Iraq’s activities in the past few years. As declared by Iraq, these are permitted activities, which will be monitored by UNMOVIC to ensure that they comply with the relevant Council resolutions. A series of new projects have been declared that are at various stages of development. They include a design for a new liquid oxygen/ethanol propellant engine and replacement of guidance systems for several surface-to-air missiles. These projects will need to be investigated and evaluated by UNMOVIC.”

“Iraq has also provided information on a short-range rocket that is manufactured using 81 mm aluminium tubes. Although this is not a new disclosure, the information may be relevant to well-publicized reports concerning the importation of aluminium tubes. At this stage, UNMOVIC has drawn no conclusions concerning the tubes, and further investigation of this will be conducted.”

“While I am on the subject of new information, I would like to mention a document recently provided by Iraq. This is the so-called Air Force document, which was once in the hands of an UNSCOM inspector and which relates to the consumption of chemical munitions in the Iraq/Iran War. Potentially, it could assist in resolving some questions relating to the material balance of chemical weapons. We are now closely examining this document to establish the scope of the information and to evaluate it in the light of information in our archives. It is too early to say whether it will support the information in Iraq’s Declaration.”

As you can see, Hans Blix plainly states that new information had been received.

Your quoted paragraph (”During the period 1991-1998, Iraq submitted many declarations called full, final and complete. Regrettably, much in these declarations proved inaccurate or incomplete or was unsupported or contradicted by evidence. In such cases, no confidence can arise that proscribed programmes or items have been eliminated.”) is included in the text of Dr Blix’s statement, but it simply refers to the period 1991-1998. It in no way comments of the content of the 7 December declaration, a link which you seem to be making here.

Comment from Stan Rosenthal
Time November 2, 2009 at 5:40 pm

Andrew, all these equivocating points were reported by Hans Blix on 19 December 19 2002. I repeat that on January 30 2003 he said very clearly that “Iraq had not fully accepted its obligation to disarm” I know you are trying very hard to give the impression that you are simply being acedemic about all this but at times you really do sound like Tariq Aziz.

Comment from andrewsimon
Time November 2, 2009 at 6:40 pm

Stan -

I can find no record of Hans Blix stating this on the date you suggest. The UNMOVIC site gives the dates of Dr Blix’s statements as being:

1) Briefing of the Security Council, on 25 November 2002: Executive Chairman’s visit to Baghdad

2) Briefing the Security Council, 19 December 2002: Inspections in Iraq and a preliminary assessment of Iraq’s weapons declaration

3) Briefing the Security Council, 9 January 2003: Inspections in Iraq and a further assessment of Iraq’s weapons declaration

4) Joint Statement, Baghdad, 20 January 2003

5) Briefing of the Security Council, 27 January 2003: An update on inspections

6) Briefing of the Security Council, 14 February 2003: An update on inspections

7) Briefing of the Security Council, 7 March 2003: Oral introduction of the 12th quarterly report of UNMOVIC

8) Introduction of the draft UNMOVIC Work Programme, 19 March 2003

9) Briefing of the Security Council, 22 April 2003: UNMOVIC’s readiness to resume operations

10) Briefing of the Security Council, 5 June 2003: Oral introduction of the 13th quarterly report of UNMOVIC

11) Acting Executive Chairman’s Speaking Notes – Security Council, 29 June 2007

A Google search for for the term “Iraq has not fully accepted its obligation to disarm” offers your own TEN LIES TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE IRAQ INQUIRY (as already posted on this website) as the first and foremost confirming link.

I do not wish to reduce this debate to the level of ad hominem argument, but if you think that I’m sounding like Tariq Aziz are you sure you’re not doing a fairly reasonable impression of Mohammed Saeed al-Sahhaf?

Comment from Stan Rosenthal
Time November 3, 2009 at 1:45 pm

Sorry, Andrew, I was three days out (due to an error in my original source material). The term was used in the course of Blix’s progress report to the UN Security Council on 27 January, 2003 reported by CNN on that date with an accompanying video of the address. The link is http://www.cnn.com/2003/us/01/27/sprj.irq.blix.report/index.html

Comment from Chris Ames
Time November 3, 2009 at 9:07 pm

Thanks Stan for highlighting another of those myths. You have selectively quoted from a very long and carefully worded speech by Blix – and misquoted him.

You say, according to this news summary that Blix said that “Iraq had not fully accepted its obligation to disarm” as if this was definitive.
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/US/01/27/sprj.irq.blix.report/index.html

On the same day, CNN posted online the whole transcript.
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/US/01/27/sprj.irq.transcript.blix/

Blix said: “Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace.”

It’s a qualified narrative comment, not an assessment. It’s about Iraq’s attitude, not its actions. If the case for war depends on such misrepresentations, you are doing a great service by highlighting them.

Comment from Aminah
Time November 3, 2009 at 10:05 pm

According to Jo Swinson the current Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs who was one of those marching in Glagow in protest of the war said Hans Blix wanted more time but they weren’t given that time because the threat was felt to be too great . If it is true that Hans Blix did ask for more time doesn’t that suggest that he was completely convinced that Iraq was breaching its international obligation?
With regard to the quote above… “Iraq had not fully accepted its obligation to disarm” . If he supposedly wanted more time to inspect and draw conclusions then if he did say that what made him do so?

Comment from andrewsimon
Time November 4, 2009 at 2:00 am

Stan -

I see Chris has picked up on this ahead of me, but I think I’d like to add a little to what has already been written here.

First up, you quoted from a CNN news report, a source which not all observers here may view as being truly objective. The containing paragraph actually reads:

Iraq provided access to all sites U.N. weapons inspectors have wanted to visit, but had not reached a “genuine acceptance” of its obligation to disarm, Blix said.

As you can see and will have read, they’ve actually put two words there inside quotation marks. They did this to indicate the actual part that was a direct quote. The rest is just a news report. Actually the paragraph contains a balancing positive, as well as that negative, as is often the case in short reporting articles.

You referred to it as “Iraq had not fully accepted its obligation to disarm”, as if this was a real (Blix) quote, which it wasn’t. I can only say that your own interpretation here could lead a reader to assume that Iraq had not accepted the obligation to disarm, whilst the emphasis given by CNN clearly indicated that it was the “genuine acceptance” of its obligations that was in question. I think that these are two very different things.

What Hans Blix actually said (or meant to say, being as this was a prepared speech), beyond that which Chris has already mentioned, which I quote from the official UNSCOM transcript on its website, was:

Unlike South Africa, which decided on its own to eliminate its nuclear weapons and welcomed inspection as a means of creating confidence in its disarmament, Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance – not even today – of the disarmament, which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace.

So Dr Blix was actually just making a comparison between South Africa’s performance with regards to WMD disarmament, conducted at a time when South Africa actually wanted to give up its programmes, and Iraq’s performance, when it found itself surrounded by its own perceived enemies and was being forced to unilaterally disarm in a historically unstable region whilst invoking (very) heavy penalties for non-compliance.

I don’t think we should doubt that Iraq begrudgingly disarmed, that’s almost certainly true. On the other hand we should not mistake its attitude for one of open defiance, which it almost certainly wasn’t during the latter stages of the WMD accounting process.

A really big question that the Inquiry is going to have to address is that of the Iraqi point-of-view. Without this I don’t believe that a balanced understanding of all that has occurred can be successfully made. Neither, Stan, do I believe that a balanced understanding (of anything) can be gained from misrepresented (and mis-dated) quotations offered without any form of contextual support.

Comment from andrewsimon
Time November 4, 2009 at 2:30 am

Aminah -

“If it is true that Hans Blix did ask for more time doesn’t that suggest that he was completely convinced that Iraq was breaching its international obligation?”

In short no. Dr Blix was mandated to resolve the outstanding issues. That resolution was underway.

“With regard to the quote above…”

It is not a definitive quote. Please see my reply to Stan.

“If he supposedly wanted more time to inspect and draw conclusions then if he did say that what made him do so?”

My reading of this (area) is that Dr Blix was playing to both sides of the house (i.e. the Security Council and Iraq) at the same time. He tried to balance the negative statements with the positive ones (and IMO did a fairly good job) because at that time, the majority of the statements were made whilst inspections were taking place. The introduction of the draft UNMOVIC Work Programme was only presented to the Security Council on 19 March 2003, where Dr Blix stated:

It might seem strange that we are presenting a draft work programme only after having already performed inspections for three and a half months. However, there were good reasons why the Council wanted to give us some time after the start of inspections to prepare this programme. During the months of the build up of our resources in Iraq, Larnaca and New York and of inspections in Iraq we have – as was indeed the purpose – learnt a great deal that has been useful to know for the drafting of our work programme and for the selection of key remaining disarmament tasks. It would have been difficult to draft it without this knowledge and this practical experience.

The time lines established in resolution 1284 (1999) have been understood to mean that the work programme was to be presented for the approval of the Council at the latest on 27 March. In order to meet the wishes of members of the Council we made the Draft Work Programme available already on Monday this week. I note that on the very same day we were constrained together with other UN units to order the withdrawal of all our inspectors and other international staff from Iraq.

Comment from Chris Ames
Time November 4, 2009 at 9:22 am

Stan,
I had a look at your previous posts on the site.
I see that in your first piece on 22 things for the Inquiry to consider http://www.iraqinquirydigest.org/?p=2048 , you claimed that Blix had “confirmed that Iraq had not fully accepted its obligation to disarm. At this point whether WMD existed or not was immaterial since this could only be determined by proper inspection and disclosure which Saddam had set his face against.” You imply that Blix’s statement was proof of non co-operation from Iraq, which made the war inevitable. In the context of Blix’s report to the UN Security Council http://edition.cnn.com/2003/US/01/27/sprj.irq.transcript.blix/ this is a travesty.
In your submission to the Inquiry http://www.iraqinquirydigest.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/Rosenthal-submission.pdf you misquote Blix’s statement as proof (the only proof) that Saddam had “rejected the final demand under Resolution 1441″ and therefore disproving the “lie” that “The war was fought to rid Iraq of weapons of mass destruction which proved to be non-existent.”
Perhaps you should write to the Inquiry again and point out that Blix did not actually use the words that you have attributed to him. But perhaps the Inquiry will look at the facts rather than misquotations derived from news reports.

Comment from Stan Rosenthal
Time November 4, 2009 at 12:34 pm

Thanks ,Chris and Andrew, for providing a perfect example of your nitpicking approach to anything that does not fit your obvious anti-war agenda (however much you try to disguise it).

The wording I and others have used is a reasonable paraphrase of what was said. Yes I inadvertently used quote marks in my submission to the inquiry (and I apologise for this) but this does not detract from the point I was making (that Blix accepted that Iraq had not fully complied with those UN resolutions requiring proof of disarmament – again I paraphrase here) and I’m sure the inquiry will see my reference to what Blix said in that light.

Those who are splitting hairs about the precise form of wording used and persist in making excuses for Saddam’s behaviour are only revealing their determination not to see what they don’t want to see.

Comment from Chris Ames
Time November 4, 2009 at 2:40 pm

Stan, it’s a shame you see this as nitpicking.

If you want to translate “Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it” into

[Blix] confirmed that “Iraq had not fully accepted its obligation to disarm” and then

“Saddam rejected the final demand under Resolution 1441″ [so we were right to start a war]

go ahead. I can’t see anyone at the Inquiry clutching at straws quite so desperately to justify the invasion.

Comment from andrewsimon
Time November 4, 2009 at 3:41 pm

Stan -

The wording I and others have used is a reasonable paraphrase of what was said.

Well, I can only leave that for others to judge. All I’ll say is that it wasn’t an overall summary of events. It was one small item picked out of a large body of complex commentary made by the leading authority on the subject in hand.

…but this does not detract from the point I was making (that Blix accepted that Iraq had not fully complied with those UN resolutions requiring proof of disarmament – again I paraphrase here)…

I accept that you are paraphrasing, but I think you are now making a slightly different point, insofar as Dr Blix probably did accept that Iraq had not fully complied with those UN resolutions requiring proof of disarmament, because the process was still underway. To put it another way, he must have accepted that Iraq had not YET fully complied with those UN resolutions because he hadn’t certified proof of the mandated disarmament or written and published a report to state that this had been achieved. This is not the same thing as claiming that Dr Blix had “confirmed that Iraq had not fully accepted its obligation to disarm”, which in itself implies that Iraq was in actual breach of its obligations.

With regards to splitting hairs about the precise form of wording used, I think that the Inquiry will be very careful in its own choice of words. I’m sure it will attempt to comprehensively explain the entirety of the situation(s) relative to its mandate. As a commentator on these proceedings I’m only trying to do the same thing, and I’m not trying to excuse Saddam Hussein’s actions in any way.

What is it that you believe that I am determined not to see or don’t want to see?

Comment from John Bone
Time November 4, 2009 at 5:41 pm

I have had a skim through Hans Blix’s book “Disarming Iraq” today. The point which comes up repeatedly is that the UK and USA governments often had a completely different perception of an issue from anyone else. The fundamental difference was that the UK and USA governments took the view that it was an established fact that Iraq had WMD, while nobody else took that view. Thus the majority of members of the Security Council did not agree with Tony Blair’s opinion that Resolution 1441 said that Iraq should hand over the WMD that we knew that it had. No other members of the Security Council thought that Resolution 1441 was based on the premise that Iraqi WMD were an established fact. To get 1441 passed by the Security Council in November 2002, the UK and the USA had to remove clauses which suggested this and which appeared to give individual members of the SC the right to attack Iraq without an explicit SC Resolution.

We now know that there were no WMD in Iraq and no WMD programmes. It was never clear what evidence was supposed to support the assertion that it was certain that Iraq had WMD. Blunkett offers no explanation why the UK government still thought in March 2003 that it was an established fact that Iraq had WMD after the inspectors had visited all places indicated by intelligence agencies and found nothing. It is therefore surprising that Blunkett’s statement continues to be based (apparently) on this assertion and that he offers no evidence to back up it up. It sometimes seems that our politicians are hinting that they don’t have to offer evidence for their assertions!

In his book Blix says that he told a journalist in September 2002 that he had a gut feeling that Iraq had WMD. He never said that he knew that Iraq had WMD, which was what the UK Government was saying and he was, of course, willng to be led by the evidence from the inspections. He says of the September 2002 dossier that it had plenty of phrases such as “intelligences says …”, which by themselves are not evidence.

Comment from Stan Rosenthal
Time November 5, 2009 at 12:27 pm

I think it might be worth recapitulating at this point to remind ourselves what this extended exchange was originally about. It started with Andrew’s rhetorical question “Who says he didn’t?” in response to David Blunkett’s assertion that Saddam had not fulfilled the terms of Resolution 1441, the implication being that Andrew believed that he did.

When I replied “Hans Blix for one” there was a concerted attempt to rubbish this obvious fact by nitpicking (sorry to use this term again but I think it does describe the process exactly) about the date on which it was said, the nuances of the precise wording he used, the context in which it was said and the fact that he hadn’t finished his work.

None of the aforementioned contradicts the essentials of my short reply, that, whatever the qualifications, Blix considered that the terms of 1441 had not been fully met when he reported back to the UN towards the end of January, whereas Andrew’s initial response suggested that he considered that the terms of the resolution had been met and that no one had said otherwise.

And, of course, Blx wanted more inspection time. That was his job and who doesn’t want to keep his job going? But the Security Council had decided, rightly in my opinion, that Saddam had been giving the inspectors the run-around for long enough and that any further extensions would simply be playng into Saddam’s hands once again

As for John’s point, Resolution 1441 only required verification that WMD stocks and programmes had been eliminated. To that extent, politicians like David Blunkett did not have to be certain that weapons existed before deeming Saddam in breach of 1441. If full verification was not forthcoming the assumption had to be that WMD still existed, even if this was not certain. You can’t take chances on these matters.

.

Comment from Chris Ames
Time November 5, 2009 at 6:47 pm

I think it might be worth giving up on this discussion at this point.

I had hoped that it might throw some light on one of the key questions “Why did the government argue for and proceed to war before the UN inspectors had established whether Iraq had wmd?”
http://www.iraqinquirydigest.org/?page_id=1147

But it’s just going round in circles with claims that bear no relation to what actually happened.
The briefing that Dr Blix gave the UN Security Council began like this:

“Mr. President, Mr. Secretary General, the resolution adopted by the Security Council on Iraq in November of last year asks UNMOVIC [U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission] and the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] to “update the council 60 days after the resumption of inspections.” This is today.

The updating, it seems, forms part of an assessment by the council and its members of the results so far of the inspections and of their role as a means to achieve verifiable disarmament in Iraq.”
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/US/01/27/sprj.irq.transcript.blix/
To take one comment from this, misquote it and then use it as evidence that Blix had definitively determined that Iraq was in breach of UNSCR 1441, is entirely unconvincing. The Inquiry is going to have to look at these issues a lot more carefully than this. It is, I think, likely to assess Blix’s report in the context in which it was requested and given and unlikely to decide that Blix was only after more time because “who doesn’t want to keep his job going?”

Comment from andrewsimon
Time November 6, 2009 at 2:36 pm

Chris –

I think it might be worth giving up on this discussion at this point.

I fear you might just be right. Stan has his version of events and he wants to stick with that. I can see how his justification for the military action is dependent on his interpretation of what Hans Blix said to the Security Council. However, in light of his last post I’m going to have one more attempt at setting the record straight.

Stan –

Thank you for posting your recapitulation to remind ourselves what this extended exchange was originally about.

It started with Andrew’s rhetorical question “Who says he didn’t?” in response to David Blunkett’s assertion that Saddam had not fulfilled the terms of Resolution 1441, the implication being that Andrew believed that he did.

This is not exactly the case. David Blunkett actually said ““I took the view that the United Nations security council resolution was very clear and laid down what Saddam Hussein had to do to qualify for an agreement that he had fulfilled the terms of resolution 1441 and when he didn’t I took the view that he had called the bluff of the world…”

The part that I am questioning is about what Saddam Hussein “had to do to qualify for an agreement that he had fulfilled the terms of resolution 1441”. This is not about whether Saddam had actually fulfilled the terms (he hadn’t – the process was still ongoing), it has much more to do with whether he was in fact doing what he had to do to qualify for the agreement. Obviously handing over the 7 December CAFCD was a large part of this, but the story wasn’t due to end there. At that time the whole process was scheduled to go on for several more months, which would have taken things to about June of 2003. This was cut short because the invasion took place when it did, and because the inspection process was halted by request of the US prior to this action.

I think these factors are very important, because as Chris writes, it is going to be very necessary for the Inquiry to establish why the British government argued for and proceeded to war before the UN inspectors had established whether Iraq actually had remaining WMD (or not).

None of the aforementioned contradicts the essentials of my short reply, that, whatever the qualifications, Blix considered that the terms of 1441 had not been fully met when he reported back to the UN towards the end of January, whereas Andrew’s initial response suggested that he considered that the terms of the resolution had been met and that no one had said otherwise.

I’m sorry if you’ve taken my initial response as suggesting this. This was not my point at all, what I was trying to get across was my interpretation of events as being that the terms of the resolution WERE in the process of being met, as was the understanding between UNMOVIC and Iraq at that point in time.

And, of course, Bl(i)x wanted more inspection time. That was his job and who doesn’t want to keep his job going? But the Security Council had decided, rightly in my opinion, that Saddam had been giving the inspectors the run-around for long enough and that any further extensions would simply be playing into Saddam’s hands once again

Your assessment of events here does not bear any relationship with the reality of these matters. The schedule for the work of UNMOVIC was set out in R.1284 (1999). There was to be a submission of a “work programme” within 60 days of the report of the resumption of formal inspections, which was officially made on 27 January. This set the date for the submission, according to Dr Blix, to be 27 March, at the latest. In actual fact this work programme was submitted ahead of time, on 19 March, because Germany, France and Russia wanted a Security Council meeting at ministerial level to give a time frame for the proposed work, and to demonstrate that the forced interruption of the inspection regime was not due to any failings, with especial regards to institutional inaction, of the Council itself.