22 things for the Inquiry to consider
The following is a post from Stan Rosenthal, at the invitation of the Digest and following Stan’s comment yesterday that the Digest “is mainly about interpreting the proceedings from an anti-war stance to produce as much material as possible to discredit the proponents of the war or if such material does not emerge to dismiss the whole thing as a whitewash.”
Stan’s piece is entitled “22 reasons why the Chilcot Inquiry should decide it was right to invade Iraq”. As editor of the Digest, I should point out that it does not invite the Inquiry to reach any particular conclusion but raises issues and evidence that its contributors think it should consider. I have therefore renamed the post to reflect this. Readers may in any case notice that Stan contributed a very similar post entitled 22 reasons why it was right to invade Iraq to Progress on 7 February 2007.
I have also corrected (in square brackets) the erroneous attribution of the legal advice of 17 March 2003 to the Tony Blair. I am not sure if “corrected” and “erroneous” are the right words. The official position is that the advice was the work of the attorney general Lord Goldsmith but Stan may merely be agreeing with those who suspect that it was actually drafted at No. 10.
22 things for the Inquiry to consider
by Stan Rosenthal
At this inquiry the self-righteous opponents of the war will continue to insist that there can be no good arguments for the war. Such has been their success in claiming the moral high ground on this issue that there are now few who are prepared to challenge them over the whole range of their propaganda. It is my belief that this is because the full weight of the case for the war has largely gone by default. Even supporters of the war can only provide a very narrow justification for the war (the desirability of over-throwing an evil dictator and standing by the Iraqi victims of the insurgency), thereby conceding much valuable territory regarding the many other equally valid reasons for the war.
Here then, in chronological order, are no less than 22 interlocking reasons why I think the inquiry should find in favour of those who took us to war.
1. The second Gulf war of 2003 followed the first Gulf war of 1991 which resulted directly from Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. It was a direct result of a breach of the cease-fire conditions relating to that invasion.
2. Instead of over-throwing Saddam at that time, the allies gave way to the prevailing liberal sentiment and left him in power on the basis that he would never be in a position to threaten neighbouring countries again.
3. The terms of the 1991 cease-fire (not a peace settlement, by the way) expressly forbade Iraq from developing WMD.
4. To that end a UN inspection regime was imposed by resolution 687 and several related resolutions, non-compliance with which would represent a breach of the cease-fire.
5. Several years passed during which UN inspections were continually being thwarted.
6. In 1998 Iraq ceased all cooperation with the United Nations and economic sanctions and no-fly zones were imposed.
7. Then came 9/11 which underlined the world-wide terrorist threat and highlighted how failing anti-West states could be used as sanctuaries and attack bases for jihadists.
8. 9/11 also pointed up the dangers of UNDER-reacting to intelligence information.
9 The intelligence was showing that Saddam still possessed WMD and was continuing with his WMD programme, despite the terms of the cease-fire and related UN resolutions.
10. The UN inspectors, most governments, every intelligence agency in the world, and even Saddam’s own generals were convinced that these weapons still existed and represented a threat, either directly through Saddam or indirectly if they were to fall into the hands of Al-qaeda. In a post-war interview with the Iraq Survey Group Saddam himself admitted that he was trying to give the impression that he had WMD for deterrent purposes.
11. If there were any doubts about the intelligence the feeling after 9/11 was probably that it was safer not to take any chances and that anyway why should a tyrant like Saddam be given the benefit of that doubt, particularly if it provided a legitimate reason for removing him from power?
12. After being given every opportunity to comply with the UN resolutions (over a considerable period) Saddam rejected the final demand under resolution 1441 (passed unanimously in November 2002) which called for “an accurate, full and final disclosure of Iraq’s WMD’s and of all aspects of its WMD programme”, and which encompassed presenting evidence that WMD stocks had been destroyed. Hans Blix the UN’s Chief weapons inspector confirmed that Iraq had not fully accepted its obligation to disarm. At this point whether WMD existed or not was immaterial since this could only be determined by proper inspection and disclosure which Saddam had set his face against.
13. Opinions differed on whether a second resolution was needed for military action. Such differences are quite common in international law since very little is clear-cut in this fairly new and arcane area of the law (which has been described as little more than a rag-bag of theories based on the writings of saints, 17th Century treaties and dysfunctional academic lawyers) .
14 To argue that the war was DEFINITELY illegal is not therefore defensible, whereas the Prime Minister’s [the attorney general's] parliamentary answer (March 17, 2003) putting the legal case for the war IS legally defensible (whatever academic reservations there might be about it).
15. The ensuing invasion presented an opportunity for (a) finally dealing with the WMD threat perceived at that time (toppling Saddam was now the only way of making sure that he did not have these weapons) (b) removing a tyrannical dictator (c) neutralising Iraq as a potential base for world-wide terrorism (d) demonstrating that the international community could not be defied on such vital issues (e) allowing US troops to be withdrawn from Saudi Arabia and its holy places (which up to that point was one of AL-qaeda’s main recruiting causes) and (f) facilitating progress to be made towards a Middle East settlement (Saddam at the very least was offering 50,000 dollars for the families of Palestinian suicide bombers!).
16. Tony Blair’s dilemma was, therefore, this. To go into Iraq meant war with all its terrible consequences. But not going into Iraq meant Saddam defying the international community and literally getting away with murder thus setting an example to other dictators and enemies of democracy. It also meant Saddam proceeding with his WMD programme to a point where he might become invulnerable, possibly passing WMD on to the jihadists, continuing his repression of his (Muslim) population, and continuing to undermine a Middle East peace settlement. Finally the need to keep US troops in Saudi Arabia would continue to give AL-qaeda a cause-celebre regarding the holy places. In other words Tony Blair was damned if he did and damned if he didn’t.
17 In coming down in favour of the war Blair no doubt saw this as the lesser of the evils and as the chance to act as a restraining influence on Bush in a way that those opposing the war were not able to do..
18 Far from the invasion being anti-Islamic, the (Islamic) Kurds, anti-Saddam Sunnis and the Shias rejoiced at being liberated from Saddam’s tyranny (even now despite the post-war mayhem a recent polls have shown that over 60% of the population believe that overthrowing Saddam was worth the hardship entailed, 75% of the Shias and 81% of the Kurds).
19. Yes, terrible mistakes were made in the post-war period (as in any war). Amongst these was underestimating the sheer depravity of an enemy which seems to be prepared to destroy the country and slaughter its people rather than to see it progress under a democratically elected government.
20 Iraq is NOT under occupation. The occupation was ended in 2004 under UN Security Council Resolution 1546 when the interim Iraqi government took power. Coalition troops have been mandated by the UN to keep the peace. The US government is pledged to comply with a UN resolution requiring them to leave if requested by the Iraqi government. Of course the presence of coalition troops will attract fire in certain areas in the way that any peace-keeping force will be resisted by those who oppose peace but such actions are very much in the minority at the present time (the insurgents preferring to direct their murderous activities at much softer targets).
21. Millions of Iraqis risked death to elect their government. Their government therefore has a greater legitimacy than almost any other government in the world. That government wants coalition troops to stay as long as it takes to do the job.
22. In the final analysis the coalition can argue that they gave the Iraqis the chance to govern themselves in a free and democratic manner. If they do not or cannot take that chance the responsibility lies primarily with those who seek to destroy that chance, not with those who gave them the chance in the first place
The over-all case emerging from this analysis is that a legally defensible war was fought to uphold UN resolutions designed to rein in an evil dictator. The resulting post-war mayhem is largely due to the determination of Iraq’s insurgents (both from within and without) to thwart the efforts of the democratically elected government of Iraq (supported by UN -mandated peace- keeping forces) to rebuild the country.
It is therefore my view that any evidence submitted to the inquiry on the particular failings of those concerned should be considered in the context of the larger picture described above. On this basis I have little doubt that the verdict will be favourable the instigators of the war.
8 Responses to “22 things for the Inquiry to consider”
Comment from CaliforniaGirl
Time October 9, 2009 at 4:17 pm
The 22 points still stand today and the inquiry will prove it. Our troops on the ground discovered cache after cache of buried weapons and money. Do you really believe Saadam would not be another Ahmadinejad if he had been left to his own desires? His desires to destroy the West? Do you really believe Saadam was stupid enough to not hide or remove those WMD’s? Some are in Syria, for Pete’s sake! Why do you think Israel did a bombing run over Syria’s nuke materials stack? Where do you think the Syrians got that stuff? We KNOW, for a FACT he had the gases and yet the Left and MSM seem to completely ignore them as a WMD. Well, if we had been sprayed or our water contaminated with siran, mustard or the other gases, I suspect we would think of them as WMD’s. Would you not? He had to be stopped. His intentions were clear and he would have done it. Ahmadinejad, Chavez, and the other little dictators who are puffing themselves up and gaining great strength, would have aided Saadam in a heartbeat. There would have been nothing we could do to have stopped them. Look how Ahamadinejad hid his nuclear plants from us. Pretty easy to hide stuff in the desert and the jungles, isn’t it? The Iraqis are better off today, have more infrasture than they had under Saadam and THAT is a FACT. Our brave troops and our brave civilian contractors are quite proud of all the improvements to come about in Iraq and well they should be. The British troops have done a bang-up job in training the Iraqi Security Forces and we must support them as long as needed to be able to fend off those terrorists (who have killed more Iraqi civilians than were killed by our troops and THAT is a FACT) who would turn them backwards like the Taliban wants to do in Afghanistan. The Iraqis and the Afghans have been slaves long enough.
Comment from Andrew M.
Time October 10, 2009 at 7:52 pm
I have taken the liberty of posting the first two parts of a multi-part response to Stan Rosenthal’s ‘22 things for the Inquiry to consider’ here.
Due to the complexity of the issues raised and the availability of time available it will take me a number of postings to complete the response.
I will endeavour to do this as quickly as is reasonably possible.
Comment from Stan Rosenthal
Time October 11, 2009 at 5:47 pm
Chris, thank you for affording me the opportunity of providing a balancing contribution to this website (although I still think it is predominately against the war rather than about impartially seeking the truth). We shall see.
As for that erroneous attribution to Tony Blair of the legal advice given on March 17 2003 (due I think to a reference to it in one of Tony Blair’s
subsequent Parliamentary answers), this was not a Freudian slip as you imply. Lord Goldsmith has strongly denied he was leaned upon in any way, in Parliament, in the media, and to the Butler inquiry. There is no material evidence to the contrary and if this website is truly about being a search for the truth I hope it will eschew this and future conspiracy theories of this nature,
Jess the Dog repeats that dog-eared canard beloved of anti-war protestors that Tony Blair took us to war on a lie. In fact it is this assertion that has always been the lie. As I said in my piece the actual casus belli was not Saddam’s proven possession of WMD but his serial non-compliance with UN resolutions calling on him to DEMONSTRATE (not just declare) that he no longer had them. In other words the onus was on him to prove he didn’t have WMD not on the coalition to prove that he did. The fact that he didn’t do this (for his own reasons)represented a clear breach of these resolutions, which were passed btw under an article of the UN Charter wh allowing a military response. So Tony Blair went to war on a fact not a lie.
Andrew, I will respond to your articles(s)on the pages where they’re posted. Suffice to say here that I agree with you about the complexity of the issues but I see in this the risk of not seeing the wood for the trees. My piece was essentially about describing the wood, the over-all considerations that may have prompted the decision to go to war. With respect, I think your piece(s) seems to be mainly about the minutaie of these considerations which can tend to obfuscate the broad thrust of the argument and at worst can lapse into a nitpicking critique of what the allies did and a self-selecting apologia of Saddam’s actions.
Comment from Chris Ames
Time October 12, 2009 at 9:42 am
I am responding here to one of Stan Rosenthal’s comments above, as it represents a significant misunderstanding of the purpose of the site.
Stan expresses the wish that the site will eschew the “conspiracy theory” that the attorney general’s legal advice of 17 March was drafted in No 10 or that he was leaned on in any way.
The main reason that this comment misses the point of the site is that it invites us to accept the attorney general’s denial as fact. There is indeed significant evidence to the contrary but, more importantly, there is unpublished evidence that the Inquiry should look at. One of the purposes of this site is to argue that this Inquiry should not merely ask those accused of wrongdoing whether they did wrong and then accept their denials. If it did this, it would indeed be a waste of time and rightly condemned as a farce and an establishment cover up. In this context, the former attorney general Lord Goldsmith is implicitly accused of wrongdoing in that he should not have given in to any pressure so that to have done so would have been to have done wrong.
It is worth observing that officials accused of giving in to pressure tend to deny it after the fact. It does them no good to admit it. An almost exact parallel can be found in Lord Hutton’s acceptance of JIC chairman John Scarlett’s claim that he was not pressured to strengthen the claims in the September 2002 dossier, in spite of clear evidence that he was. During the hearings, Scarlett admitted that the view expressed in this email http://www.the-hutton-inquiry.org.uk/content/cab/cab_11_0025to0026.pdf “Think we’re in a lot of trouble with this as it stands now” was put to him at a meeting http://www.the-hutton-inquiry.org.uk/content/cab/cab_11_0028.pdf on the same evening. It also emerged this year that a senior Cabinet Office official had invited Scarlett to drop caveats from the dossier. see http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/mar/13/iraq-documents-cabinet-office
The only reasonable conclusion from this is that a denial from an official that he or she was leaned on is almost entirely worthless.
This brings us very nicely to Goldsmith. The government eventually admitted that his unequivocal advice of 17/3/03 was different from the lengthy equivocal advice of ten days earlier. According to the government’s own version of events, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/5017872.stm Goldsmith was invited to change his mind because his initial advice was too equivocal for the chief of the defence staff:
“On 12 March, the Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Defence wrote to the Legal Secretary to the Law Officers, following up on the Chief of the Defence Staff’s comments the previous day. In that letter the MoD Legal Adviser recorded that he had informed the CDS that ‘if the Attorney General has advised that he is satisfied that the proposed military action by the UK would be in accordance with national and international law, [the CDS] can properly give his order committing UK forces’ … The Attorney General recognised therefore that he needed to indicate his clear view as to whether military action would be lawful ”
So the chief of the defence staff tells the attorney general that if he does not change his mind, the policy that – as the attorney well knows – the prime minister has been pursuing for the past year will have to be abandoned. That is clear evidence of pressure, whatever Goldsmith says.
Also, according to the government’s own version of events, Goldsmith then met Sally Morgan from Tony Blair’s office and Lord Falconer on 13 March 2003, the very day he changed his mind. In the first place, there has to be a question of what the purpose of the meeting was and how appropriate it was. Why was Falconer, a junior minister with no legal role, meeting the attorney general?
The government claimed that Goldsmith had already changed his mind earlier that day but it has since emerged that there was no material evidence to support this. see http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/jan/13/iraq-iraq
But, even accepting the government’s chronology, between changing his mind on 13 March and publishing his unequivocal advice on the 17th, Goldsmith met Morgan and Falconer. What does the note of this meeting say? It is not clear that there is one. In the absence of evidence, other than evidence of a meeting that is highly inappropriate, why should anyone accept an assertion from Goldsmith that “neither Baroness Morgan of Huyton nor Lord Falconer of Thoroton, nor any official in the Prime Minister’s office had any involvement whatever in the drafting of the answer”?
Indeed, Goldsmith has admitted that his one-page answer was a team effort: “”The written answer of 17 March 2003 was drawn up in my office. Those involved were myself, the Solicitor General, two officials in my office, three officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth office, and Christopher Greenwood QC. The draft was also discussed with the then Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine of Lairg. I was fully involved throughout the drafting process and personally finalised, and of course approved, the answer.” In these circumstances, the opinion is only Goldsmith’s to the extent that he put his name to it. As with Scarlett, the question of who influenced him and to what extent along the way remains open. If one simply accepts that if a person asserts that a view was his own, independent view you have to discard all evidence that others sought to influence him during the time that he changed his mind, you may as well not bother looking into the issue. Hopefully, the Inquiry will look at evidence rather than mere unsubstantiated assertions and denials.
Comment from Stan Rosenthal
Time October 12, 2009 at 5:04 pm
Glad you picked up on this point, Chris, since I think your response has all the classical ingredients of a conspiracy theory. No denial is accepted. The worst possible interpretation is put on any action or inaction. Innuendo, clutching at straws, red herrings,abound. Every scrap of information is amassed to cast aspersions on what has been said, whether or not it is strictly to the point.
In this case the real point is whether the Attorney General was convinced that there was a lawful basis for the use of force in Iraq without a second UN resolution. The Cabinet Office’s Disclosure Statement (which incidentally is a masterly exposition of how the decision was made) clearly shows that he was convinced and Lord Goldsmith has repeatedly confirmed this personally.
Of course there was widespread consultation with all interested parties before the decision was taken (Lord Goldsmith would have been failing in his duty if he had not done this) but such consultation doesn’t necessarily mean he was leaned on. As with all conspiracy theories any innocent action can be made to look sinister if you try hard enough. Certainly Goldsmith may have been INFLUENCED by what had been said to him but surely that’s what a consultation exercise is all about. Being influenced is not at all the same thing as being “leaned on” with all its Mafia-type connotations.
As for changing his mind, what lawyer has not changed his mind when considering complex issues of law. However, reading through the Disclosure Statement there is no indication that Lord Goldsmith “had been invited to change his mind” or that he had actually changed his mind. There is only an earlier reference to “the safest course”. being to have a second resolution. This was obviously advised as a “belt and braces” approach given the legal and particularly political challenges expected. A “belt and braces” approach does not imply you think your trousers will fall down without both being in place. In this context it was simply about avoiding fuss.
When it became apparent that a second resolution would not be forthcoming the military naturally wanted a clear view on whether the case stood up without it, which the Attorney-General duly delivered.. To argue that this represented pressure by the military to make him change his mind is absurd.
Likewise I see nothing sinister in Goldsmith putting his name to a document which his legal team had helped him to draw up. That’s the way things are normally done in legal and other organisations.
Nor do I see anything particularly untoward in that meeting at No.10. The Disclosure Statement says this was simply for the Attorney General to report his findings. As someone who has worked with lawyers in the past that seems to be reasonable enough to me. I frequently had such meetings Indeed I sometimes challenged the lawyers’ conclusions if they were not to my liking but that did not mean I was leaning on them to produce something that they knew to be illegal.
Finally I totally agree with you that the Inquiry should look at evidence rather than mere unsubstantiated assertions (which litter the case against the war) and denials (which tend to be related to the case for the war). However, I hope you will agree with me that when someone denies he or she was leaned on when coming to a decision this can only be proved otherwise by clear evidence that he or she was threatened in some way (as opposed to just being asked to take certain things into account, which is a normal part of the deliberative process). In the absence of such evidence, such allegations should be consigned to the dustbin.
Comment from Chris Ames
Time October 12, 2009 at 11:56 pm
Stan, thanks again for making a point that allows me to stress the purpose of the Digest.
I should again stress that the Inquiry needs to look at all of the evidence available to it, including the documents that the “Disclosure Statement” purports to summarise.
In setting out a largely polemical argument that the view published by Goldsmith on 17 March 2003 was his own independent view, you have cherry-picked the parts of the disclosure statement that best suits that case. With breathtaking naivity, you have also quoted the government’s unsubstantiated claims in its defence:
“The Disclosure Statement says this was simply for the Attorney General to report his findings… that seems to be reasonable enough to me.”
The disclosure statement is, as you say, “a masterly exposition” of the government’s case. As an argument for a particular view of things it is cleverly written but clearly selective in its deployment of the facts. As a disclosure under FOI it is a disgrace, written in loaded language that is clearly intended to put a particular gloss on events. It is no more or less than a piece of spin. For example, quoting the advice of 7 March, the best that the statement can say is that Goldsmith thought a “reasonable case could be made” for the revival argument. It leaves out his warnings that a court might think otherwise. Reading the statement, you have mistakenly formed the impression that the advice of 7 March was clear and unequivocal, which leads you to argue that Goldsmith did not subsequently reach a different conclusion, even though he makes clear that he did (see the quote below).
Also, as I have pointed out, the statement claims, with no material evidence for the claim, that Goldsmith met Morgan and Falconer after “he had reached the clear conclusion that the better view was that there was a lawful basis for the use of force without a second resolution.”
These are just two of many examples where the disclosure statement presents the events of 7-17 March in a particular way.
My point then is that if you want to present a polemical case that the process was clean, you will seize on the disclosure statement as supporting your case. If you are not so inclined – and are not inclined to treat an official statement as the unchallengeable truth, you will want the Inquiry to look at the genuine evidence with an open mind.
Comment from Stan Rosenthal
Time October 13, 2009 at 3:55 pm
Chris, I would only reply that it is quite usual for a legal opinion to cover any possible weaknesses in a complex case that is being made before coming down in its favour. In his opinion of March 7 the Attorney-General clearly concluded that military action without a second UN resolution was legally defensible despite the weaknesses in the case at that time.
This position did not change but simply hardened up as a result of the events and deliberations which took place between 7 – 17 March.
So there was no significant difference between the advice given on the 7 and 17 March as you claim. If there is any gloss or spin on this matter I think it is coming mainly from your side.
Comment from Jess The Dog
Time October 8, 2009 at 9:53 pm
Stan Rosenthal was banging on about this at he time of the war, as I recall, including the polarisation argument – “if you don’t want war, you will let Saddam get away with it.”
There may not have been widespread objection to a war with the expressed aim of the removal of Saddam Hussein, but that was not the war that was launched. The war that was launched was because of a stated WMD threat. This was a lie, and this is the critical point.