Comments on: Dossier was sexed-up http://www.iraqinquirydigest.org/?p=3751 Everything about the Chilcot Inquiry in one place Thu, 9 Sep 2010 11:04:58 -0600 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.1 hourly 1 By: chris lamb http://www.iraqinquirydigest.org/?p=3751&cpage=1#comment-523 chris lamb Thu, 26 Nov 2009 21:06:55 +0000 http://www.iraqinquirydigest.org/?p=3751#comment-523 This tends to be perhaps too downbeat an analysis of Day 2 evidence. What seems to have been missed from the Ehrman and Dowse evidence is that, at the crucial time invasion was being driven through the Cabinet and Parliament from 10-18 March 2003, enough was known officially about the intelligence not being sufficiently reliable and, thus, that any construction of a WMD "imminent threat" was highly suspect. Even if Blair was personally driven to perpetuate the deception underlying the pretext of WMDs, why did the key Cabinet meetings of 13 and 17 March 2003 apparently not deliberate upon the meeting held in February 2003, mentioned by Dowse, between Blix and ministers in which Blix torpedoed the myth of WMD, or indeed the intelligence report of 10 March on "disassembled" CWs and warheads? Why did the intelligence drawn by MI6 from Saddam's defected intelligence chief, Tahir Jalil Habbush- rubbishing WMD claims- also not figure in these deliberations? It is not even clear whether Cabinet properly considered the UN weapons inspector report on Iraqi disarmament of 07 March. There can only be two conclusions drawn. Either vital evidence extant at the time was withheld from Cabinet by Blair and his minders because it would sink his version of events or the Cabinet had this information and deliberately ignored it in order to rubber stamp Blair's position. On both counts, this signifies a serious failure of Cabinet government in checking and balancing Prime Ministerial power and shows the edifice of deception- and the potential breach of international law- to have been systemic and not just down to one individual- overpowerful though Blair and the Prime Ministerial office undoubtedly were. The way the Government managed the Parliamentary business and votes for the invasion resolution also manifested a stranglehold against any countervailing evidence from being presented. The opposition amendment to the resolution was only allowed the most cursory time for presentation. The suppresion of countervailing evidence and denial of a proper debate was as serious an abuse as the Executive power misleading Parliament over the real purpose of the invasion. This tends to be perhaps too downbeat an analysis of Day 2 evidence. What seems to have been missed from the Ehrman and Dowse evidence is that, at the crucial time invasion was being driven through the Cabinet and Parliament from 10-18 March 2003, enough was known officially about the intelligence not being sufficiently reliable and, thus, that any construction of a WMD “imminent threat” was highly suspect.

Even if Blair was personally driven to perpetuate the deception underlying the pretext of WMDs, why did the key Cabinet meetings of 13 and 17 March 2003 apparently not deliberate upon the meeting held in February 2003, mentioned by Dowse, between Blix and ministers in which Blix torpedoed the myth of WMD, or indeed the intelligence report of 10 March on “disassembled” CWs and warheads? Why did the intelligence drawn by MI6 from Saddam’s defected intelligence chief, Tahir Jalil Habbush- rubbishing WMD claims- also not figure in these deliberations? It is not even clear whether Cabinet properly considered the UN weapons inspector report on Iraqi disarmament of 07 March.

There can only be two conclusions drawn. Either vital evidence extant at the time was withheld from Cabinet by Blair and his minders because it would sink his version of events or the Cabinet had this information and deliberately ignored it in order to rubber stamp Blair’s position.

On both counts, this signifies a serious failure of Cabinet government in checking and balancing Prime Ministerial power and shows the edifice of deception- and the potential breach of international law- to have been systemic and not just down to one individual- overpowerful though Blair and the Prime Ministerial office undoubtedly were.

The way the Government managed the Parliamentary business and votes for the invasion resolution also manifested a stranglehold against any countervailing evidence from being presented. The opposition amendment to the resolution was only allowed the most cursory time for presentation. The suppresion of countervailing evidence and denial of a proper debate was as serious an abuse as the Executive power misleading Parliament over the real purpose of the invasion.

]]> By: andrewsimon http://www.iraqinquirydigest.org/?p=3751&cpage=1#comment-505 andrewsimon Wed, 25 Nov 2009 23:30:34 +0000 http://www.iraqinquirydigest.org/?p=3751#comment-505 More like William Ehrman was sexing things up. Page 41 of today's (morning) transcript: ...we were not receiving contradictory intelligence to what we got up to then. We did, in the very final days before military action, receive some on CBW use that it was disassembled, that you might not have the munitions to deliver it. Page 96 of today's (morning) transcript: We did, at the very end, I think, on 10 March, get a report that chemical weapons might have remained disassembled and Saddam hadn't yet ordered their assembly, and there was also a suggestion that Iraq might lack warheads capable of the effective dispersal of agents. But until then, until 10 March and this was assessed in a JIC assessment on 19 March we hadn't had contrary intelligence. Page 99 of today's (morning) transcript: No, but in a sense the two bits of intelligence we had got almost confirmed that he did have this. It said that CW remained disassembled. Well, there must be some there to remain disassembled, and that, also, he might not have the munitions for the effective dispersal of agents. It wasn't questioning whether agents existed. This is really what he's talking about - from the Butler report: 204. ...We have also noted information from one intelligence source in 1998 suggesting that Iraq retained sufficient complete missiles and components to allow it to assemble up to 16 missiles in total. 206. We conclude that the impression left by JIC assessments in the mind of readers at the time of departure of the United Nations inspectors will have been of concern about the ability of Iraq to regenerate a small number of ballistic missiles, either through bringing back into use missiles that had been hidden or by re-assembling missiles from hidden components. He's not talking about chemical weapons at all, he is talking about one particular delivery system (Scud missiles, of which none remained in Iraq) and conflating them to be chemical weapons to justify the claims that were made about their existence. Is this the first demonstrable example of the Inquiry committee being told (or sold) a crock of ****? More like William Ehrman was sexing things up.

Page 41 of today’s (morning) transcript:

…we were not receiving contradictory intelligence to what we got up to then. We did, in the very final days before military action, receive some on CBW use that it was disassembled, that you might not have the munitions to deliver it.

Page 96 of today’s (morning) transcript:

We did, at the very end, I think, on 10 March, get a report that chemical weapons might have remained disassembled and Saddam hadn’t yet ordered their assembly, and there was also a suggestion that Iraq might lack warheads capable of the effective dispersal of agents. But until
then, until 10 March and this was assessed in a JIC assessment on 19 March we hadn’t had contrary intelligence.

Page 99 of today’s (morning) transcript:

No, but in a sense the two bits of intelligence we had got almost confirmed that he did have this. It said that CW remained disassembled. Well, there must be some there to remain disassembled, and that, also, he might not have the munitions for the effective dispersal of agents. It wasn’t questioning whether agents existed.

This is really what he’s talking about – from the Butler report:

204. …We have also noted information from one intelligence source in 1998 suggesting that Iraq retained sufficient complete missiles and components to allow it to assemble up to 16 missiles in total.

206. We conclude that the impression left by JIC assessments in the mind of readers at the time of departure of the United Nations inspectors will have been of concern about the ability of Iraq to regenerate a small number of ballistic missiles, either through bringing back into use missiles that had been hidden or by re-assembling missiles from hidden components.

He’s not talking about chemical weapons at all, he is talking about one particular delivery system (Scud missiles, of which none remained in Iraq) and conflating them to be chemical weapons to justify the claims that were made about their existence.

Is this the first demonstrable example of the Inquiry committee being told (or sold) a crock of ****?

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